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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN C. WEISER, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
[revised] 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910749302PR. 
Hon. Rodney S. Paije 
The Court having considered the various proceedings previously conducted by the Court 
and the Court's prior rulings in the case and having further considered that all issues before the 
I O I 
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Court have been heretofore resolved or adjudicated, the Court hereby makes its findings of fact7 
conclusions of law and order and judgment as follows: 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. This long enduring case arises from an aciion that was filed by Glen C. VYciser 
(hereinafter the "Plaintiff* or "Weiser") against defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(hereinafter "Union Pacific" or "Railroad") regarding a parcel of land located in Davis County, 
Utah near the Salt Lake County line (hereinafter the "Property"). 
2. A brief history of the case is given by the Supreme Court in Weiser v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., 932 P.2d 596 (Utah 1997)» which provides, in part, as follows, "In 1873, 
Wciser's most remote predecessor in interest purportedly received title to the disputed land 
through a federal land grant patent issued by President Ulysses S. Grant. In 1935, the district 
court for Davis County quieted title to the disputed property in Roelof Steenblik, one of Wetser's 
predecessors in interest. All known entities with a possible claim to the property were made 
parties to that action. The Railroad was not made a party because there was no public record of 
• its interest. The Railroad did receive constructive notice by publication, however," Id. at 597, 
3. " In 1982, Union Pacific began construction of a semi-truck loading facility on the 
disputed property, in 1987, Weiser discovered die Railroad's use of the property and through 
counsel requested the Railroad to surrender and vacate the property. The Railroad refused, and 
Weiser bad Associated Title Company prepare a title report, which showed that Weiser owned 
the property in fee simple. He again made a formal demand diat the Railroad surrender and 
2 
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vacate the property. Union Pacific again refused. Plaintiff brought this action to gain possession 
of and to quiet title to the property/' Id. ai 597. 
4. Union Pacific defended the action "contending that the United Stales had granted 
its predecessor in interest^  Utah Central Railroad, a 40(Wbot-wide "right-of-way through public 
lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph" in March of 1870, One of the conditions 
of the grant was that within three months after the passage of the 1870 Act, the Railroad file with 
the Secretary of Interior a map approved by him "exhibiting the line of said company, as the 
same has been located and constructed/* The parties dispute whether this condition was fulfilled, 
Weiser contends that because the Railroad did not timely file a certified map that was accepted 
by the Secretary of Interior, the Railroad's grant of right-of-way fails, [footnote omitted]. Afler 
extensive research and historical analysis, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment that 
the grant to the Railroad failed for lack of condition/* Id. at 597. 
5. Through extensive summary judgment proceedings, the Court detenmined that the 
following facts relating to the parties* controversy were undisputed, 
(a) The Act of Congress of December 15,1870 (16 Stat. 395) (hereinafter "1870 Act"), 
which is relevant in this matter, provides among other things as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, that the right of way through the public lands be, and 
the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created 
under the laws of the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and 
assigns, for the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden 
City, in the territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said territory;... Said way is granted to 
said railroad to the extent of 200 feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may 
pass through the public domain ... Providcd> lhat within three months from the passage 
of this act the said Utah Central Railroad Company shall file with the Secretary of the 
3 
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Interior a map approved by him, exhibiting the line of the railroad ofsach company as 
Z the same has been located and constructed: .,, 
5T 
M 
16 Stat. 395 (December 15, 1870). 
(b) The conditional 200 foot right of way grant pursuant to the 1870 Act would overlap 
substantially all of plaintiffs property (hereinafter "Property") which is the subject of this action. 
(c) On March 7,1871, a profile map was filed with the office of the Secretary of the 
Interior by the Utah Central Railroad. Defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a successor in 
interest to the Utah Central Railroad. 
(d) On the following day, the map was rejected by the Secretary of the Interior and 
returned to the Utah Central Railroad on grounds that il was not certified. 
(e) On March 30,1871, the Utah Central Railroad resubmitted die profile map 
(presumably a certified map) which was duly accepted by the Secretary of the Interior on that 
date. 
(f) The Utah Central Railroad failed to file a certified map with the Secretary of the 
Interior within the time limitation set by Congress in the 1B70 Act. 
(g) In exchange for consideration, plaintiffs predecessors in interest received title to 
the Property by patent from the United States Government on September 25, 187[3) [sic], 
0) Plaintiffs chain of title in the Property appears on the record of the Davis County 
Recorder in which county the Property is situated-
(k) A right-of-way grant to the Utah Central Railroad, which is at issue in this case, 
does not appear on any of the plat maps recorded in the Davis County Recorder's Office. 
4 
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' (I) PlaintiTf and his predecessors in interest have paid the property taxes on the 
w 
8 Properly for at least the pasL 25 years. 
g (m) Defendant made its First improvements and enclosures on the Property when it 
I 
.N commenced the construction of the TOFC facility in 1982. 
(n) There is a disputed question of fact whether defendant Union Pacific Railroad 
and/or its predecessor's have paid property taxes on the property, 
6. The Court granted Weiser7s motion for partial summary judgment pertaining to 
tho land grant issue in 1995, The Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was 
denied. Thereafter, an appeal was pursued by the Railroad which was later dismissed by the 
Supreme Court. On October 19, 2000, the Railroad filed a motion for reconsideration. Weiser 
objected to the motion as untimely and improper. The Court determined that it would consider 
the motion, 
7. Upon considering the Railroad's motion, the Court determined that despite its 
prior granting of partial summaiy judgment in favor of Weiser, the doctrine of stare decisis 
required the Court to alter its prior ruling in the case.1 The Court concluded that it was 
compelled under the doctrine of stare decisis to change its decision despite the fact that the 
undisputed facts reflected that the Utah Central Railroad had failed to comply with the 
Conditional Grant. In making its decision the Court acknowledged that Weiser was not a party 
to any of the decisions cited by the Court and was not afforded an opportunity to present 
evidence or raise issues in those cases. 
5 
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> 8. The Court rejected Weiser's arguments that the Court should have analyzed the 
5 issues in the case under the doctrines ofres judicata and collateral estoppel and that neither 
g doctrine was binding upon Weiser in this case. Based upon the Court's legal reasoning, the 
ji Court reversed its prior summary judgment made in favor of Weiser and granted the Railroad's 
motion for partial summary judgment in its October 1, 2001 ruling, 
9, Based upon the Courts' amended ruling that the Conditional Grant was valid, the 
Court addressed the character of the Grant. The Grant provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is 
hereby> granted to the Utah Central Railroad Company, a corporation created under the 
laws of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and assigns, for 
the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near Ogden City, in the 
Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said Territory; and the right, power, and authority 
is hereby given to said corporation to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of 
said road material of earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction thereof Said 
way is granted to said railroad to the extent of two hundred feet in width on each side of 
said railroad where it may pass through the public domain, . . . 
10. The Court then concluded that the foregoing conveyance conveyed a fee or 
limited fee interest in the Property to the Railroad and Weiser has no remaining interest in the 
Property. The Court rejected Weiser's argument thai the Conditional Grant conveyed only a 
right-of-way to the Utah Central Railroad. Consequently, the Court concluded that the subject 
Property was owned by the Railroad.2 
The Coun also concluded that Weiser lacked standing lo challenge the Grant, 
' There was only D small part of ihe Property chat was outside of the 400 foot right-of-way and the parties have 
settled any claim thereto. 
6 
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11. However, the Court concluded that the Property was in fact part of the "public 
lands" at the time of the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress. In making the foregoing 
determination the Court rejected Weiser's argument that the Property was not taken out of the 
public lands because Weiser's original predecessor (Tomlinson) had acquired a homestead or 
pre-emption interest in the property, Weiser contended that Tomlinson's interest in the property 
was superior to the Railroad's because Tomlinson presented his Declaratory Statement of Pre-
emption on April 17, 1869 before the Conditional Grant was approved by Congress and therefore 
the Property was not pan of the "public lands*' at die time Congress approved the Conditional 
Grant. Weiser contended that his position was supported by case authority. The Court rejected 
Weiser's arguments and concluded that the period of time for perfecting an interest in Property 
through the doctrine of pre-emption is determined by the date that the final proof of pre-emption 
was completed on July 6, 1872 and not on April 17, 1869 when Tornlinson's Declaratory 
Statement of Pre-emption was made. Because the Court concluded that the date of proof is the 
controlling date for the purpose of determining when whether the Property was part of the public 
lands, the Court determined that the evidence proffered by Weiser at an evidentiary hearing that 
Tomlinson Declaration Statement was made on the public record on April 17, 1869 (before the 
Conditional Grant was approved by Congress) was irrelevant-
12. The Court also concluded that the Decree Quieting Title made in favor of 
Weiser's predecessor by the Fourth District Court is not dispositive or binding upon this Court's 
determination that the Property belongs to the Railroad because no action under state law has the 
abilily to limit or circumscribe land rights granted to the Railroad. In making this determination 
7 
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 the Court rejected Weiser's argument thai the Decree Quieting Title to the Property made by the 
n 
§ honorable Judge Pratt in 1935 is binding and enforceable under the doctrines of res judicata and 
? 
a collateral estoppel because the Railroad had no interest of record in the County Recorder and 
*3 because the Railroad received constructive notice of the quiet title action by means of publication. 
13. The Court has also concluded thai the conveyance of its interest in the Property to 
another did not cause the Property to revert to Weiser. The Court also rejected the argument 
raised by Weiser that defendant Union Pacific intended to remise or release its interest in the 
Property when it quitclaimed its interest in the Property to another and rejects the assertion that 
the conveyance of its interest by quitclaim deed was conclusive evidence. Weiser contended that 
if the conveyance of the Property was a limited fee conveyance, the limited fee was made subject 
to reverter to the United States and thereafter passed to Weiser through his chain of title 
stemming back to the original land patent given to Tomlinson. 
14. The Court has determined that the Railroad did not obtain any interest in the 
Property by way of adverse possession because it did not satisfy the requirements needed to 
establish a claim of adverse possession and that its ownership interest in the Property is based 
solely upon the Conditional Grant 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions made by the Court and the prior 
proceedings in the case, the Court makes and enters its order and judgment as follows: 
ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad received a limited fee interest in the 
Property pursuant to the Conditional Grant; 
8 
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4 
ORDERED that defendant Union Pacific Railroad's limited fee did not revert back to the 
United States and then transfer fonvard to Weiser when Union Pacific Railroad purported to 
convey its purported interest to another; 
J 
i ORDERED that Weiser's claims for relief as alleged in his complaint including his 
claims to quiet title, restitution, forcible detainer, treble damages, trespass and unjust enrichment 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
ORDERED that defendani Union Pacific Railroad's alleged defense of adverse 
possession is also dismissed for cause; and 
ORDERED that this Judgment is final as to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered 
by the Clerk of the Court without further delay, the Court having determined that all claims 
between the parties in this case have now been adjudicated. 
DATED this a l ^ d a y o f ' ' T ^ r - ^ ^ W r 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
HON. R O D l ^ S.PAGE 
District Court Judge 
9 
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FARMINGTON, UTAH DECEMBER 8, 2005 
THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. 
MS. PECK: Morning. 
THE COURT: This is the time set for a hearing in the 
matter of Glen C. Weiser versus Union Pacific Railroad, This 
is case number 910749302. Mr. Weiser is not present, 
apparently is ill and has not been able to be here today, but 
itfs the decision of his counsel and Mr. Wiser to go ahead in 
this matter. Is that correct, Mr. Call? 
MR. CALL: (Unintelligible) 
THE COURT: Mr. call is here representing Mr. Weiser 
along with co-counsel. The defendant is represented by 
Mr. Jeffery Devashrayee — 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Yes. 
THE COURT: — who is representing the Railroad. Is the 
3 
plaintiff ready to proceed, Mr. Call? 
MR. CALL: We are, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is the defendant ready, Mr. Devashrayee? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do either of you wish to make opening 
statements? Mr. Call? 
MR. CALL: I believe we}d just proceed with the 
testimony at this time and then reserve that statement for 
after. 
THE COURT: Is that agreeable with you, Mr. Devashrayee? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. Call your 
first witness. 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, the plaintiff, would call Max 
Elliott to the stand. 
THE COURT: Mr. Elliott, will you step up and be sworn 
please. 
If you'll have a seat on the witness stand please. 
MAX ELLIOTT, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CALL: 
Q. Good morning, Mr. Elliott. 
A. Good morning. 
4 
Q. How are you this morning? 
A. Ifm good. 
Q. Good. We appreciate you coming today. Can you state 
your full name for the record please. 
A. Max Brent Elliott. 
Q. And what is your currently address, Mr. Elliott? 
A. 917 South 250 East, Farmington, Utah. 
Q. And just very briefly, what is your educational 
background? 
A. I attended college at Weber College and Brigham Young 
University. Took correspondence courses in surveying. 
Q. And what licenses do you hold? 
A. I hold a license as a licensed land surveyor in the 
State Of Utah, licensed — license number 141269. 
Q. And where are you currently employed? 
A. I'm currently employed by Davis County. 
Q. And how long have you been employed by Davis County? 
A. I've been with Davis County 45 years approximately. 
Q. In what capacity? 
A. To begin with, I just worked with the surveying crew. 
Then when I was licensed in '64, I was over the crew. And 
then eventually I became the Deputy County Surveyor and now I 
am presently the County Surveyor. 
Q. Okay. Are you acquainted with the method of surveying 
and the responsibilities of surveyors in connection with the 
5 
standards established in the State of Utah? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Are you acquainted with the method of recording 
documents in the Davis County — 
A. I am. 
Q. — (Unintelligible)? 
A. We work — in our capacity as the County Surveyor, we 
work a lot, as do all surveyors, with the records of the 
various courthouses. Specifically in my case, it would be 
the courthouse of Davis County, the Recorder!s Office. 
Q. And in connection with this case, have you had an 
opportunity to review the records of the county with respect 
to the property that's in dispute which is located in Section 
14? 
A. I have. 
Q. Okay. And what materials have you reviewed in 
connection with Section 14? 
A. I reviewed from the patent at the time that the property 
was deeded to George Tomlinson, the transactions since then 
where he!d deeded it like to Malcolm McDuff, McDuff deeded 
back to him. Then McDuff deeded to Hancocks. All -- all 
these deeds I'm very familiar with. 
There was a question raised in my mind as to the 
relationship of the patent, and understanding a little bit 
about preemption — 
6 
Q. Okay. Let me — let me — 
A. Okay. 
Q. I!ll address that. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Okay. Based on the records that you have reviewed and 
your experience as a surveyor, do you have an understanding 
as to the history of Section 14 located in Davis County? 
A. I do. 
Q. Okay. Does that information indicate, in your opinion, 
where the centerline of the railroad track was located with 
respect to the Utah Central Railroad? 
A. From the deeds you can come up with the centerline of 
the Union Pacific Railroad, or the Utah Central Railroad 
then. 
Q. Okay. And in connection with your work, have you 
prepared a plat or a map of various deeds as they appear on 
the records of the county? 
A. I prepared this one from the records of Davis County, 
this plat that's here. 
Q. Okay. And when you say this one, are you referring to 
what's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1? 
A. Yes, 1 am. 
Q. And is that your surveyor's certificate that appears on 
that plat? 
A. That is — 
002950 
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Q. (Unintelligible) 
A. That is correct, that is — 
Q. Okay. 
A. — my certificate. 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, we'd move for admission of 
Exhibit 1. 
THE COURT: Mr. Devashrayee. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Your Honor, the only comment I have is 
that it!s not accurate with respect to the Court1s ruling 
earlier a couple of times with regard to ownership of that, 
of the right of way. Otherwise, I don!t have any objection 
to it. 
THE COURT: Noting that the Court has previously 
determined the ownership of the easement, the only issue 
before the Court is the question of where the centerline of 
the original road lied. The Court will receive it only as to 
that issue. Relative to the other issues, the Court will not 
receive it. And so it's limited for that purpose, and I will 
receive it for that purpose only. 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Mr. Elliott, in looking at Exhibit 1, if 
you would for a minute, could you explain to the Court, if 
you would, the contents of that exhibit. 
A. We show the dash — I show the dashed line where the 200 
feet would be each side of the centerline of the Utah Central 
nnoQci 
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Railroad. I also show the deeds and they — how they were 
conveyed, like to Denver and Rio Grande Railroad, to Mellons 
and others, warranty deeds, other deeds that were deeded to 
those folks way back in the beginning. 
Q. Okay. And in looking at these color codes that you have 
on this exhibit, do those — those legends that you have 
there correlate with the deeds with respect to each of those 
properties? 
A. Yes, that's — that is the purpose and intent for the 
keys over here on the right-hand side. 
Q. Okay. And with respect to those deeds, is there 
information that would indicate in the deeds that you have 
reviewed where the centerline is with respect to the Utah 
Central Railroad? 
A. Yes, they do. 
Q. Okay. Would you explain to the Court which deeds you1re 
referring to. 
A. Yes. The second one down where it!s the Hancock, the 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, April the 
28th, 1884, recorded in Book H, page 570, Davis County 
Recorder!s Office, ties it to the north quarter corner and 
leaves no doubt as to what itfs doing. Especially when you 
look to the deed which is immediately south of that, which is 
a deed from George Tomlinson to Denver and Rio Grande 
Railroad, March 22nd, 1883. In — in talking about his 
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parcel, they describe it as being bounded on the north by 
Thomas Hancock, bounded on the south by Thomas Hancock, and 
bounded on the east side by the Utah Central Railroad. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Then the description across there, which is the Mellon 
description, which is clear over — right on the top clear to 
the right-hand side, says, Thomas Hancock and Sarah Ann 
Hancock to Joesph W. Mellon, April the 2nd, 1920, recorded in 
Book 1-C, page 519, Davis County Recorder's Office, that is 
also tied to the north quarter corner as it comes up there 
and describes it. And there's — you can determine the 
centerline of the railroad, the Central Railroad, from those 
two descriptions --
Q. Okay. 
A. — at that point. 
Q. And the deeds that you're referring to, are they set 
forth in Exhibits 33, 34 and 35 of Plaintiff's Exhibit? Will 
you take a minute and look at those? 
THE COURT: What exhibit numbers are they, Mister — 
MR. CALL: 33, 34, and 35. 
THE WITNESS: The two that I'm specifically talking 
about is 33 is correct. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. 
A. 34 is further south down the railroad. It's — I 
mentioned it, but it's not the one that I'm specifically 
rio n o r o 
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using at this time. The other one is the deed to Mellon. 
And letfs see — 
Q. Well, let's just go through them one at a time then — 
A. Okay. 
Q. — so with respect to Exhibit No. 34 — 
A. Okay. 
Q. — that.was the — one of deeds that you relied upon in 
making that determination? 
A. No. 33 was. 
Q. No. 33. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And is that -- is that deed that's been set out 
in Exhibit 33 a true and correct copy of the deed that was 
recorded with the County Recorder? 
A. Yeah. We have the actual deed here as Book H of Deeds, 
page 570, which is from the County Recorder's records. 
MR. CALL: Okay. Your Honor, we'd move for the 
admission of Exhibit 33. 
THE COURT: Any objection with the same limitation, Mr. 
Devashrayee? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: No objection with the same limitation, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 33 will be received. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. What was the other deed that you 
looked at, Mr. Elliott? 
nnooc/i 
11 
A. The other one is the deed to Mellon, which is on the 
east side. Let me look here and see which one it is. 
It's number 36. That deed is mentioned I think 
previously as in Book 1-C of Deeds, page 519. 
MR. CALL: Okay. Your Honor, we'd move for the 
admission of the warranty deed that has been presented as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 36. 
THE COURT: Mr. Devashrayee, with the same 
qualification? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Yes, your Honor. And I — I probably 
won't have any objections with regard to these deeds as long 
as we have that qualification, which I think embodies my 
concern about relevance (Unintelligible). Is that fair? 
THE COURT: That!s --
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: And I!m not gonna have any problem — 
THE COURT: The reason the Court is receiving them is 
centerline issue only. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. CALL: Well, your Honor, may I address that briefly? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. CALL: It was my understanding that these 
proceedings were not only to determine the centerline, but 
also the boundaries of the Weiser property with respect to 
the right of way and how much of the property of the Weiser 
property lies outside of the 400-foot right of way — 
nnonrc 
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THE COURT: That may be the issue also, but the key is 
where that centerline is. 
MR. CALL: Right. And — 
THE COURT: There's no question it goes 2 00 feet on each 
side of that centerline, and so the question of where the 
Weiser property would lie is also relevant, but — 
MR. CALL: Right. 
THE COURT: — not the chain of title. 
MR. CALL: But in addition to that, your Honor, these 
are public records, they're self-authenticating, and so we — 
when the Court says that there's a limitation, I mean I 
understand that there's some relevancy limitation, but these 
are authentic — 
THE COURT: Doesn't matter. I'm not considering them 
for that issue. The Court's already ruled on that as far as 
those things are concerned, and you need to realize that I'm 
receiving them for only that purpose. That's the only reason 
they'll be received by the Court and allowed in evidence. 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay? 
MR. CALL: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. With — what other materials did 
you consider, Mr. Elliott, in deciding where the centerline 
of that Utah Central Railroad track was located? 
A. The other Denver and Rio Grande descriptions that were 
nnoftcc 
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deeded further south also — 
Q. Okay. Which deed was that that you considered? 
A. That was the No. 34, I believe. Let me look. 
Q. And what was that transfer, Mr. Elliott? 
A. That was Thomas Hancock to Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company. It begins at station 144 plus 17, a point 
275 feet east of the quarter post between Sections 11 and 14, 
Township 1 North, Range 1 West. And 725 feet south, 3 
degrees 15 minutes west along the centerline of said railway. 
They1re speaking of the Denver and Rio Grande, but it 
lies immediately against the Utah Central Railroad. 
MR. CALL: Okay. With that, your Honor, we?d also move 
for Exhibit 34. 
THE COURT: 34 is received. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: No objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: What's your objection on that? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: No objection. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Subject to the qualification. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Mr. Elliott, in addition to the deeds that 
we've discussed, what other information have you deter — 
have you looked at in determining where the centerline of the 
Utah Central Railroad is located with respect to the records 
of the county? 
rin o O C T 
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A. I have looked at the Louis L. Pomantier deed that he 
gave to Utah Central Railroad and — but it does not tie it 
down, it just gives the width of it, saying itfs 50 feet on 
each side of the survey line or along the road. 
Q. And which exhibit is that, Mr. Elliott? 
A. That's Deed No. 4, Lewis Pomantier to Utah Central 
Railroad, June 17th, 1870. 
Q. And is that reflected on your map? 
A. It is. 
Q. And how is it reflected? 
A. ItTs the yellow area about halfway through the Tomlinson 
property (unintelligible) south. 
Q. And does that deed, it is reference the — does it 
reference the centerline of the railroad track? 
A. That's what it — it was from — what it called for — 
well, let's read it. That probably is better than me trying 
to explain it. 
Book B of Deeds, page 170, Louis L. Pomantier to Utah 
Central Railroad Company, know all men by these presents that 
I, Louis D. (sic) Pomantier of Salt Lake City of the County 
of Salt Lake and Territory of Utah, in consideration of the 
sum of one dollar in hand paid by the Utah Central Railroad 
Company of Utah Territory, have bargained and sold and do 
hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey under the said 
railroad company, their successors in office and assigns 
nnnnco 
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forever a certain tract of land, situated, lying, and being 
in the County of Davis, in territory aforesaid, bounded and 
described as follows, to wit: All that portion of land 
situated in the south half of the northeast quarter of 
Section 14, Township 1 North, Range 1 West, U.S. Survey, Salt 
Lake Meridian. Within lines running parallel with the line 
of survey of said railroad as now located on each side of the 
line of said road at a distance of 50 feet therefrom. A 
certified map of said road is now located, being recorded in 
the Recorder's Office of said county. 
Do you want me to go or stop — 
Q. No, that — thatfs fine. 
A. That pretty well covers what we're talking about, the 
centerline. 
Q. WeTd move, your Honor — well, let me first ask, 
Mr. Elliott, is Exhibit 4 a true and correct copy of the deed 
that was recorded with the County Recorder? 
A. It is. 
MR. CALL: We'd move for admission of Exhibit 4. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: No objection subject to qualification. 
THE COURT: 4 is received with that limitation. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Based on the various records that you 
reviewed, Mr. Elliott, do you have an opinion as to where the 
centerline track was of the Utah Central Railroad? 
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A. Absolutely. From the deed from Hancock to the Utah 
Cen — or to Denver and Rio Grande Railroad and Thomas 
Hancock to the Mellons, yeah, that defines it well. 
Q. In addition to these deeds, have you also reviewed other 
maps and materials that are located within the County 
Recorder r s Office? 
A. I have over the years, yes. 
Q. And what is your opinion as to the location of that 
centerline, Mr. Elliott? 
A. Well, I think these two deeds reflect basically where 
that 100 foot is between the two deeds, and the centerline 
would be 50 feet from either one of them. 
Q. Okay. And so is that centerline reflected where the 
track is located on your Exhibit No. 1? 
A. As per the records, yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I have not — I have not conducted an actual field 
survey. This is strictly from the records. 
Q. Right. Have you reviewed field surveys that have been 
done of the property, however? 
A. Only those — I!ve looked at them briefly — that have 
been done. 
Q. Now, I believe you mentioned, Mr. Elliott, that — and 
let me ask you, with respect to the records of the county, is 
it your understanding — you1re familiar with the dispute in 
nnoQAO 
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this case; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you're familiar with the right of way issue that's 
been in dispute in this case? 
A. I am. 
Q. Okay. And as the County Surveyor, are you familiar with 
the records that exist with respect to those properties that 
are adjacent to the railroad? 
A. You mean the patents where Utah Central Railroad went 
through the properties — 
Q. Yes. 
A. — in Davis County? Yes, very much so. 
Q. Okay. And are you familiar with which properties were 
public lands at the time that the railroad received its 
conveyance from the United States in December of 1870? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Objection, your Honor, irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CALL: Well, your Honor, can I address that issue? 
THE COURT: You can. 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, based on this Court's prior 
ruling, this court, it's our understanding, determined that 
the light of way grant that was given to the Union Pacific 
Railroad was in fact a valid grant, and we're assuming that 
to be true. That grant, however, was made subject to the 
condition that it was only over the public lands. Mr. 
nnonc1 
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Elliott, who is here, will testify if permitted that in fact, 
the Weiser property was not public land at the time that the 
right of way was given. We are not here seeking to challenge 
this Court's decision on the validity of that grant. That we 
understand and we respect the Court's decision that that has 
been — that has been decided. The issue which hasn't been 
decided, however, is whether or not these are in fact public 
lands. And in order for Mr. Weiser to be able to fairly 
present to this Court the proper boundaries of that right of 
way as set forth on the public records, is for Mr. Elliott to 
be able to testify as to whether or not this property was 
public land at the time that grant was given. This case, 
your Honor, has gone on for many, many years, and this is the 
first evidentiary hearing that has ever been held in this 
matter. We don't think that the Court has ever received any 
evidence or affidavit with respect to whether this property 
is public land or wasn't public land at the time the 
conveyance was made. Mr. Elliott is very familiar with the 
events that occurred at the time of the recording of the 
right of way or at the time that that grant was given, and we 
think it's extremely relevant in order to determine the 
boundaries of that right of way, which is the purpose of this 
hearing, that he be permitted to testify whether — whether 
part of this property was public land at the time that that 
railroad right of way was — the profile map with respect to 
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that right of way was recorded. 
THE COURT: Mr. Devashrayee. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Whether this is public land or private 
land has absolutely nothing to do with what we're here for 
today. And the fact is, the Court has already ruled — let 
me read from the Court's ruling which the Court is already 
familiar with. The court determined that the patent for the 
(unintelligible) George Tomlinson was included in the right 
of way granted the railroad and was a nullity. The reason 
being that the land which is part of the 1870 grant to the 
railroad was taken out of the public land subject to 
preemption and sale and, therefore, the Land Department was 
without authority to convey any rights therein. 
That is — that!s the Court's ruling and that is a 
correct ruling, it's consistent with the law, and it has — 
whether this land's public or private land has absolutely 
nothing to do with finding the centerline in the 400-foot 
grant of right of way, which has been confirmed as being 
valid and effective. 
THE COURT: (Unintelligible) 
MR. CALL: May I respond, your Honor? 
THE COURT: No. Based upon the evidence presented to 
the Court at the time its ruling was made, the Court has 
ruled on this issue and I will sustain the objection, period. 
MR. CALL: Okay. With that, your Honor, may we — may 
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we at least for purposes of the record — 
THE COURT: You can proffer — 
MR. CALL: — make a proffer with Mr. Elliott now? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. CALL: Because we don!t want to have to come back, 
your Honor. We just think that Mr. Elliott has gone through 
this in great detail, and if we could go through and put this 
evidence on the record, then it would be there for further 
review. 
THE COURT: If11 allow you to proffer it in that 
respect. Mr. Devashrayee. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Your Honor, do I just sit and listen 
to the proffer then? I — you have my objections. 
THE COURT: You can listen to the proffer noting that it 
comes in only for the purposes of the record. The Court has 
sustained your objection and I will not consider it in my 
ruling. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. Mr. Elliott, in connection with 
your testimony — with your review of the records, we were 
discussing the public record that -- the records of the 
county and what constituted public land in 1870. Are you 
with me? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. You previously testified I believe that you were 
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familiar with the various records and deeds as they existed 
in Section 14. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you've reviewed them with respect to the status of 
those deeds in 1870; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And do the records of the county reflect that the Weiser 
property or even the Tomlinson property, as referred to on 
your Exhibit 1, does it reflect that that was public land in 
1870? 
A. No, it doesn't reflect either. 
Q. Is it -- from the records of the county that you have 
reviewed, does it indicate that there was some claim or 
preemption made on the Tomlinson land prior to 1870? 
A. Do I have latitude to speak? 
Q. Yes. Yes, and let me just — in talking about the 
Tomlinson property, it's my understanding that it's defined 
by the outer brackets — 
A. The Tom — the Tomlinson property includes this plus the 
northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of Section 14 and 
lot 2 that sits down below here. 
Q. Okay. 
A. A total of 150.50 acres. We're looking at 80 acres of 
the 150.50 acres. 
Q. Okay. And in 1870, however, the Weiser property was 
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part of that Tomlinson property; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. And would you for the benefit of the Court in 
connection with this proffer indicate what records reflect as 
to your opinion that this was not public land in 1870? 
And let me just maybe help you through this and ask 
you — 
A. Okay. 
Q. — could you explain to the Court — 
THE COURT: Well, let me just indicate, Ifm not gonna 
let you lead him through a bunch of things, Counsel — 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: — if he wants to — if he can respond to 
your questions, that's fine, but — 
THE WITNESS: Let me say this: I'm familiar with Utah 
Central Railroad all the way through Davis County. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. 
A. As they go through Davis County — 
Q. Yeah. 
A. — in most instances, they acquired, Utah Central 
Railroad, from the settlers a hundred-foot right of way, 50 
feet each side of the road or survey line they described it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. The majority of the property that they went through had 
not received their patent by December the 15th, 1870. 
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Q. Okay, And why is that? 
A. Because there's a process that you have to go through to 
get your patent. The patent isnTt the beginning, it's the 
conclusion of the law of 1841, that you have to make a 
declaratory statement, then either be on the ground or go on 
the ground. You had to be a citizen of the United States or 
be — or make application to become a citizen of the United 
States. You had to also not have more than one preemption. 
You had to be the head of a home or of age or you could be a 
woman and still have been eligible to do those things under 
that law. Also, you had to then prove to the United States 
of America that you had been on the land, that you met all 
these commitments, and then pay them. If it was 160 acres, 
you had to pay $1.25 an acre. If it was less than 160 acres, 
you had to pay $2.50 an acre for that land. 
Q. And in this case, did Mr. Tomlinson, who is the — do 
the records reflect that Mr. Tomlinson was the first claimant 
to this property? 
A. Yes, he!s the — he!s the one that got the patent. 
Q. Do the records of the county reflect that Mr. Tomlinson 
made a declaratory statement with respect to this property? 
A. No, they do not. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But the National Archives, U.S. Land Office, kept all 
that kind of information. They've done a beautiful job. 
nnor*£ -7 
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Q. And have you reviewed those records? 
A. I have. 
Q. And do those records reflect that Mr. Tomlinson made a 
declaratory statement that was recorded on April 17th, 1869? 
A. They do. 
Q. Do the records further reflect that there were other 
competing declaratory statements made on that property? 
A. In the same year, there was a Mr. Pomantier, Louis L. 
Pomantier, the same one that gave the deed to Utah Central 
Railroad, he made a declaratory statement. And also a Mr. 
Sabine, a Mr. McDuff, and also a Mr. Varley. 
Q. Okay. And so when you refer to the one that gave the 
Central Railroad a deed, Mr. Pomantier — 
Just if I might approach, your Honor. 
Mr. Pomantier who deeded this property to Utah Central 
Railroad, referring to the yellow property here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. He gave a deed to the Utah Central Railroad for that 
property? 
A. He did, found in Book B, page 170 of the Davis County 
Recorder's Office. 
Q. Okay. And he had made a preemptive claim in 1869 as 
well? 
A. Yes. He made his declaratory statement, No. 631 or 681, 
itfs hard to read, for the lot 3 in the southwest quarter of 
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the northeast quarter of 14, 1 North, 1 West, Louis L. 
Pomantier, May the 22nd, '69. 
Q. Okay. And would you — could I refer you to Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8. 
A. Now, which one's this? 
Q. Exhibit 8. 
A. 8? Okay. Yes. 
Q. Could you explain to the Court what that record reflects 
or what the relevancy of that is with respect to these 
statements of preemption? 
A. This is No. 742, cash entry, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Territory, Section 14, 1 North, 1 West, patent September the 
25th, 1873, declaratory statement. And at that point — and 
this comes from the National Archives. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That point, they go through and they say that — they 
mention George Tomlinson, April 17th, '69, made his 
declaratory statement, his first declaratory statement. 
Declaratory statement. And then after that, they said, it 
conflicts with — and they give No. 631 or 681, which is 
Louis L. Pomantier, and it looks like a J — you can't make 
out the rest of his name -- Sabine, and he made his April 
23rd, '69. And then there's a couple others. But it 
mentions all these that have made statements in '69 that 
they're gonna go onto that ground and prove it, become 
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their1s. 
Q. And why were these statements made in 1869? 
A. As Ifve looked through some of the records, it appears 
to me that in 1869 is when they finally opened the office in 
the Utah Territory in Salt Lake City. I remember reading 
that date. I 
Q. Is there information or is there — are there — is 
there information in the public records that youfve referred 
to that indicates when Mr. Tomlinson entered on the property 
that you've designated as — on your map? 
A. Yes. Number — let's see — 
Q. Well, go ahead. 
A. No. 6 of the exhibits. 
Q. Yes. | 
A. A neighbor — here!s what it says: I, Thomas Hancock, a 
citizen of the United States and of lawful age, do solemnly 
swear that I am well acquainted with George Tomlinson, who is 
a naturalized citizen of the United States, and the head of a 
family consisting of a wife and one child, and is an 
inhabitant of the northeast — of the northwest quarter and 
lot 2 and west half of northeast quarter Section 14 of 
Township 1 North, Range 1 West. And that no other person 
resided upon the said land entitled to the right of 
preemption. That the said George Tomlinson entered upon and 
made a settlement in person on the said land since the 1st 
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step — and I prepared — let me just indicate for the Court 
that I prepared this exhibit to reflect steps that you 
articulated them as they occurred with respect to this 
property. 
A. Uh-huh, that's correct? 
Q. And let me just give you a copy of this, if I might. 
May I approach the witness, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Excuse me. Okay. On step No. 3 there, 
you indicated I believe that there has to be a proof of 
preemption thatfs made at some point in time; is that 
correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And would you explain for the Court whether 
Mr. Tomlinson made that proof and how that may have been 
made. 
A. Mr. Tomlinson had Mr. Hancock prepare a document that 
was accepted and was with those documents we received from 
the National Archives, which is No. 6. Can I read that? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I, Thomas Hancock, a citizen of the United States, of 
lawful age, do solemnly swear that I am well acquainted with 
George Tomlinson, who is a naturalized citizen of the United 
States, and the head of a family consisting of a wife and one 
child. And is inhabitant of the northeast of the northwest 
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quarter of lot — and lot 2 and the west half of the 
northeast quarter num — of Section 14 of Township 1 North of 
Range 1 West. And that no other person reside upon the said 
land entitled to the right of preemption. That the said 
George Tomlinson entered upon and made a settlement in person 
on the said land since the 1st day of June, 1840, to wit: On 
the 17th day April, 1871, and has erected thereon a log 
house, 14 by 16 feet, with roof, floors, doors, and windows, 
and is a comfortable home to live in. And has lived in the 
said house and made it his exclusive home from the 17th day 
of April, 1871, to the present time. That he did not remove 
from his own land within the Territory of Utah to make the 
settlement above referred to. And that he has since said 
settlement plowed, fenced, and cultivated about 50 acres of 
said land, and has thereon 115 rods of fencing. Signed by 
Thomas Hancock. Received by J.D. Overton, Receiver. And 
he — he says he — that — do hereby certify that the above 
affidavit was taken and subscribed before me this 6th day of 
February, A.D. 1872. 
Q. Okay. And then referring to Exhibit 13, Mr. Elliott, is 
that the other document you — I believe you referred to with 
respect to the proof made by Mr. Tomlinson? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. Could you — could you either read or explain to the 
court the purpose of that — 
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A. I!ll read it because it — it's pretty clear in the way 
it's written by them. 
Q. Okay. 
A. This is Certificate No. 742 — which is also the number 
that finally the patent was given under. Proof of right of 
preemption of George Tomlinson, Section 14, Township 1 North, 
Range 1 West, Preemption Act, 14th of September, 1841. 
Allowed this 6th day of february, 1872, George — I think 
it's George — G-e~o R. Maxwell, and Overton, I can't — 
he's — I can't read his first name. George Tomlinson, 
claiming the right of preemption under the provisions of the 
Act of Congress, entitled an act to appropriate the proceeds 
of the public lands and to grant preemption rights, approved 
September the 4th, 1841 to the northeast of the northwest, 
the west half of the northeast quarter, lot 2 of Section No. 
14 of Township No. 1 North of Range 1-E. 
And they correct that. There was an error in that one. 
Should have been 1-W, but — and they — and everything else 
has the W, but this does have E. 
Q. Thank you. 
A. Subject to sale at the Land Office at Salt Lake City, do 
solemnly swear that I have never had the benefit of any right 
of preemption under this act. That I am not the owner of 320 
acres of any land in any state or territory of the United 
States. Nor have I settled upon and improved said land to 
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sell the same on speculation, but in good faith to 
appropriate it to my exclusive use or benefit, and that I 
have not directly or indirectly made any agreement or 
contract in any way or manner with any person or persons 
whatsoever by which the title which I may acquire from the 
government of the United States should inure in whole or in 
part to the benefit of any person except myself. 
It!s signed with his mark, George Tomlinson. I, 
George — G-0 R. Maxwell, register of the Land Office, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, do hereby certify that the above affidavit 
was taken and subscribed before me this 6th day of February, 
A.D. 1872. Again he signs his name G-E-0 R, period, Maxwell, 
Register. 
Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that both of these — if 
I've understood your testimony correctly, itfs — these 
documents were provided to the Land Office in order for 
Mr. Tomlinson to prove up his preemption? 
A. Yeah, and Ifve been impressed at how well they kept the 
records back there. 
Q. Okay. And on your outline here, Mr. Elliott, you've 
indicated that as step No. 4, that there must be a statement 
of no other preemption claim. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Do the records of the county reflect that Mr. Tomlinson 
had made a preemption claim on any other property in the 
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county? 
A. ITm not — I wouldn't know on 
himself with just what I read has 
any 
Q. 
other preemptions. 
And you're not familiar with 
record — 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Mr. 
pate 
A. 
Q. 
No, no. 
— that would contradict that 
No, I'm not. 
Okay. What was the next step 
Tomlinson needed to undertake 
.nt? 
He had to pay the money. 
And is that what you refer to 
preemption claim? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
ref 1 
made 
A. 
Yes, that would be correct. 
Is that step No. 5? 
That is correct. 
Would you please indicate to 
all the county r but he 
stated that he has not made 
any evidence in 
, are you? 
as 
the 
you understood it that 
in order to obtain his 
as 
the 
the settlement on 
Court what the records 
ect with respect to any payment or settlement 
by Mr. Tomlinson with the United 
I will. No. 12 is again No. 
received his patent — 
Q. Okay. Let me just — for the 
to Exhibit 12? 
742, 
States Land 
the number 
record, you're 
that was 
Office? 
which he 
referring 
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A. I am. 
Q. Okay. And could you identify that document? 
A. This is the Receiverfs Office — 
Q. Could I get you to pull that microphone down just a 
little bit there? You put your hand up so that — there. 
Thank you. 
(Transcriber's note: When the witness placed 
his mouth close to the microphone, it caused 
the sound to be distorted and made it often 
difficult to understand.) 
A. This is the Receiver's Office at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
February the 6th, 1872. Received from George Tomlinson of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum of $37 6.25 due in full for 
the west half of the northeast quarter and the northeast 
quarter of the northwest — let's see, and the — the west 
half of the northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of 
the northwest quarter and lot 2 of Section No. 14 in Section 
No. 1 North of Range 1 West, containing 150 acres and 50 
hundredths, at two — and it — it's hard to read, but when 
you — they dated the balance of $37 6.25. And if you divide 
that by 150.50 acres, that's $2.50 an acre. 
Q. Okay. And is that the quanlity of acreage that the 
county records reflect that Mr. Tomlinson had made a 
preemptive claim for? 
A. That is what he received his patent for is 150.5 acres 
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as described here with this description. No. 7 also refers 
to the same thing, only this is to the Register. 
Q. Okay. Let me just make — okay. So Exhibit No. 7 is a 
record. Could you identify that document for the court 
please. 
A. Yes, itfs No. 742, and itfs Exhibit No. 7, where he 
goes — and the Register is — pretty well says the same 
thing that the Receiver did. That — this one's not as easy 
as to read, somebody has smeared through it, but you can 
pretty tell it out. I'll read it, too. Land Office of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, February the 6th, 1872. It is hereby 
certified that in pursuance of law, George Tomlinson, Salt 
Lake County, Territory of Utah, on this date purchased of the 
Register of this office the lot or west half of northeast — 
and you can't read what's there — the northeast of the 
northwest quarter and lot 2 of Section 14 in Township 1 North 
of Range 1 West, containing 150 and five -- 50 hundredths of 
an acre at the rate of $2.50 per acre, amounting to $376.25, 
for which the said George Tomlinson has made payment in full 
as required by law. 
Now, therefore, be it known that on presentation of this 
certificate-to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, 
the said George Tomlinson shall be entitled to receive a 
patent for the lots above described. G-e-o R. Maxwell, 
Register. 
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Q. Okay. So itfs my understanding from what you've read, 
Mr. Elliott, and the exhibits that you've provided that 
public records clearly indicate that Mr. Tomlinson paid for 
the 150.5 acres. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And that was — those payments were made pursuant to the 
preemption that he had previously made. 
A. That is correct. That was — this is the conclusion of 
the process. 
Q. Okay. Now, after the payment was made, as step No. 6, 
you indicate that there was a call for patent from the United 
States; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Could I refer you to Exhibit No. 9. 
And let me — before I get to that, let me just 
indicate, recognizing the Court's ruling but for purposes of 
the proffer, we'd ask that these exhibits be received. 
THE COURT: The Court will deny their reception; 
however, they will remain a part of the record to be included 
as part of the proffer that was made. 
MR. CALL: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. Exhibit No. 9, Mr. Tomlinson. 
A. Relationship to Mr. Tomlinson — 
Q. Could you identify that document. 
A. Yes. This is a — I would like to read it. It's pretty 
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ll well self-ex — 
21 Q. If you c o i i J d :i de i I t :i f y j t a i i d then just tell us wh a t i t 
J s and then read 
r
 MI i' ihj, '"< nid it is where h e ' s I t h i n k i t ' s where 
he's --- he wants to receive his patent. 
I in 
II • 
A MaLt Lake City, January — I cai I 't r ead tl iat. To tt le 
1
'. mmissioner, General Land Office. Dear Sir, I would be glad 
i:o receive the patent s Lor m, land i1" tuin as practical -
101 practicable. If you can forward it without delay, you will 
11
 ender forever aonie thing, yours respectfully, George 
:
 romlinson, as follows, No. 7 42, Township h 11M UI of Range 
W< ' ,l , ill ai i Si ir\/ ey. /inu i r"j.fu know if h e r s saying paid up 
i wihd , February the 6th, !- ^  . 
Okay. And the payments that you referred to under 
16 
18 
19 
21 
23 
24 
2b 
Exhibit — or i mder your step It , ' , "'hi t dates were those 
oayments made on? 
A. They wen; also — J et me ] ook, but I'm think they 
were February the 6th, also in 1872. 
Y^ 'i, ! heTj
 fm». February the 6thf 1 872, also. 
V1 Okay. And so that's the date that's reflected there in 
2 : he call for the patent, 
Uh-huh . Yes, i t i s, tl ie bottom tl lere . 
".,2. So the records reflect, if I've understood your 
testimony correctJy, I' 1i Ml I \o\ l., that full payment was made 
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l> Mr. Tomlinson pursuant to his preemptive claim on February 
I he 6th, 1872? 
31 A. Chat; is correct. According to the records from the 
4| National Aichxvo; . 
51 Q. ' I, : , . And after that payment was made, what was the 
jioxl •.. u. p Nun
 (H'i'in i of l wi 1" i i respect to these events? 
71 A. Evidently, he didn't get: his patent immediately because 
iavp -- N< : ). ] 9 is next in order as I look at this. It. is 
•;j the Salt Lake Land Office talking to tl le Comrnissioner General 
Washington, D.C. Can I read this? 
11; . Y--
12 United States Land Office, Salt Lake City, June the 
• , • . ' , .,., * . » * ' r,, rp-a'ieral Land Office, 
14 Washi nutcn, D.*". tMi, referring to your letter G ot Apiil 
- c~h entiy Wo. '•']'i of George Tomlinson, I 
16 have to state that James Sabine and Loan:; I,. t'lnantJer K r ^ 
• • .\n notified of the decision of the Honorable Secretary of 
18 the Interior in the irtattot > ! the application to enter the 
19J west half of the northeast quarter and lots 1 and 2 of 
Section 1 i , Township 1 Norih, Ranqe 1 West. And no further 
21 steps have been taken by said parties in the case. h,L. 
;
 "can! i oi has » larae ranch in Rich County, at least 175) 
23 miles distance from this place, and (Unintelligible) lias 
24 resided there for a number of years past. Sabine lives 
25 Salt Lake, and we know of no person OJ persons living on.or 
laying claim to any portion of this other than George 
T^ rri] inson. RespucLiuJ. ly, something Overton, Receiver, and 
i'-o-,^  k. Maxwell, Register. 
Q. M • . , I'orpanti er and Mr. Sabine, are they not 
the two other gentlemen that you mentioned who had made 
I > t eempti ve cJ a:i rris i n 18 69? 
A, They are two of them, yes. 
1 iWid is this to the same Tomlinson property, the one 
t hat V. • 
A. ieb. 
O, — identified n, ] AW wap? 
i, Yes, it's the same property that they're r e f e n i n n t< 
lere. And in . iddit. ion, they mention lot 2 when they're 
r
:a 1 king about this 
Okay. 
A. -- which i s below it. 
Then on page 3 of Exhibit 19 there, is there a letter 
that is -- that i s sei it * it appears you've got a letter 
from, the United States Land Office to the Commissionei". 
A IJ unit" M • • n i irnber which one ? 
Q. Page 3 of Exhibit 1 9. 
ft Tl l i s i s t h e — t h e r e i s a l e t t e r . I t ' s - - i t ' s way 
a f t e r t h e f a c t . I would 1 i ko lo L<:MLI I t , llh>ugh. 
;. okay . 
Number - - .  .n the l e f t - h a n d s i d e i t s a y s , c a s h 742, 
4U 
in 
i i 
II referring i-o "i / p»U*ni number. Territory of Utah, County of 
' J 1 i" T,aoj, patent delivered by Register md Rec^iv^r, R.K., 
.mil if says, but that's win > itOd be I "in sure i: 
! referring • *. George Tomlinson, teJJHi ilrst -July sworn, says 
the identical George Tomlinson who made cash entry 
i
 ; . 42 for the west hai i <>) m< M'MH']<-"ist quarter and Hie 
'•^ Lheast quarter of the northwest quarter and Lot d oi 
j Section 14, Town plat ' N^ilh, Panqe 1 West, upon the 6th day 
of February, 1872. That sometime in l<Jbif i sunt ir 
certificate of receipt, entry No. '7 4?, hv J.B. Overton, I 
believe, Receiver, together with an erroneous patent to the 
Co mm i .ssi DIK.M O£ the General Land Office for correction, and 
received no receipt or — or memorandum from him thereof 
! riubs-' u Lbed. 
And then he witnesses i i. ....md he swore to it on the 29th 
isv '^f November, Territory of Utah, County of oa.it Lctke. 
1 •: ' • :• - "'. Ler uhere by the name I think 
181 of :m guessing Master that's there. And then lie has 
1^ 1 - -• - . - Carles Burns and Malcolm McDuff, each for 
himself and not for one ai iolh«ji, :ri; ih.ii they are well 
acquainted with George Tomlinson, who to thoi i own knowledge 
is the identical peiswn wn - in jd<- i lie above-mentioned entry. 
And that said Malcolm. McDuff (Unintelligible) lor himself 
says that hf w.u.; present and saw George Tomlinson deliver his 
Receiver's receipt to the Receiver of the hand Office as by 
15 
16 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
him, and hi s (Unintelligible) set forth. Malcolm H. McDuff, 
subscribed, «:JiaJ l.i\"j Burn,., md w.is swuin to before me this 
29th of -- I'm not sure of the month and Ifm not sure oi: Lh*-.' 
but J I lii ill il''> 1 R M n, something McMaster, Register. 
Q And who is the land Receiver and Register? 
ionnd those individuals. 
They are the employees of the United Stales of America 
vvnu were taking care of making sure everything is done 
correctly with the preempt;!.on ].<iw. 
Okay. 
And set Lie i s < i i i I M"1 i HI H I, 
Now, if I could refer you to Exhibit. 3 9, was there a 
• . Receiver and the Register both to the 
Commissioner of .'M General Land Office in Wash Lngt.on, I1.1.' 
That is the one I did read, No. 19 --
Q. Okay. 
n. •••• and yes, it was signed by both of them, both 
respectful]y, .something Overton, Receiver, and G-e-o R. 
Maxwell, Register. 
MR. CALL: okay. Your Honor, subject to the prior -- Is 
'h" proffer thatfs being made, we won] d ask tl le Cour t to 
receive the exhibits that have been referred to by the 
witness, i n d u i n g ;•..<:^  \ ^ • , was the other exhibit 
there +"hat you read from — 
;, ,., . ^ _ ,
 u t ] r i e exhibits that 
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Ifve received as part of the proffer. Ifve received 2, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 12, 13, 19, and 20. And although they are not received 
for the purpose of the matter that is here before the Court, 
they will be received and retained in the record for the 
purpose of the proffer. 
MR. CALL: Thank you. Was that Exhibit 2 0 that you were 
referring to? 
THE COURT: That was the Tomlinson patent. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Is that what you were reading from was — 
A. No. The last one I was reading from — 
THE COURT: Believe it was 19. 
THE WITNESS: 19. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Exhibit 19. 
A. And the one that — and No. 9 and 19, Ifve read from 
both those. I have not read from the patent yet. That!s No. 
20. 
Q. No, I — we're coming to that. 
A. Okay. 
Q. I just wanted to make sure that we had that other 
exhibit that you read from in here. Was that No. 9 that you 
were reading from? 
A. Just now or before, sir° 
Q. Just — just now, the last one that you finished. 
A. The last one — well, we moved from No. 9 and that 
letter of 1880, we moved back and talked about briefly No. 19 
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again. 
Q. 
he'd 
1865 
A. 
so I 
thos 
Okay. I was referring to the one that indicated that 
been — excuse me, that he'd been on the ground since 
• 
Well, that — that was number — it!s right after No. 9, 
would assume that that!s — let's take a look. 
THE COURT: Believe itfs 19. 
THE WITNESS: 19 is the one from those. And that's — 
e are more important, but the letter I read from 18 65 
where he states 
but 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
not in here 
that — I find it — that may be in my files, 
(BY MR. CALL) Do you have a copy 
I do. 
Can I look 
Yes. That 
Can I take 
Sure. 
THE COURT: 
MR. CALL: 
THE COURT: 
sources. 
Q. 
and 
MR. CALL: 
THE COURT: 
at that? 
of that document? 
1s the one that mentions the 1865. 
this out and have it marked as an exhibit? 
You know, it appears 
Okay. 
— because he!s read 
Okay. 
So let!s don!t spend 
(BY MR. CALL) Okay, Mr. Elliott, 
to be redundant — 
that before from other 
time doing that. 
based on those events 
the determination made by the Land Office, was there a 
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patent that was issued to Mr. Elliott — or to Mr. Tomlinson? 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. And before we get to that, let me just ask, you've gone 
through, you've read a lot of legal descriptions when you 
have recited these documents upon which you have based your 
opinion or your analysis. Do those legal descriptions 
include the property which is referred to on your map as the 
Weiser property? 
A. Yes. The Weiser property falls within the west half of 
the northeast quarter of Section 14, Township 1 North, Range 
1 West, Salt Lake Basin Meridian, and it definitely is within 
the property that they're talking about here with Tomlinson. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Is this still part of the proffer? 
MR. CALL: This is part of the proffer — 
THE COURT: Still part of the proffer. 
MR. CALL: (Unintelligible) 
THE COURT: As far as I — let us know when that ends, 
will you? 
MR. CALL: I will, your honor. 
THE COURT: Hope that ends sometime soon. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. Would you then identify the patent 
that was received by Mr. Tomlinson? 
A. Yes, No. 20 is the patent that was received by 
Mr. George Tomlinson, September the 25th, 1873. 
Q. And is that patent duly recorded on the records of the 
45 
county? 
A. It is. It's recorded in Book C, page 458 of the Davis 
County Recorder's Office. 
MR. CALL: We move, your Honor, for admission of that 
exhibit based on the same proffer. 
THE COURT: 20 is received under the same limitation and 
solely for the purpose of the proffer. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Since, Mr. Elliott — and this is part of 
the proffer as well. I'll let the Court know when we're 
finished. But since the patent was received, has the county 
considered this property to be privately owned since that 
time? 
A. Yes, we've considered it as private property. We've 
taxed it as the property throughout the years. We still show 
on the present record that these individuals own those 
properties that -- that have come down from the Tomlinson 
patent, the properties. 
Q. Is there anything in the county records that indicated 
that — that this property was transferred to the Utah 
Central Railroad? 
A. Nothing in the records. There are maps that were 
prepared by Oregon Shortline Railroad where they claimed it, 
because they couldn't find a deed, I assume. That's an 
assumption on my part, but they did on their map say that it 
was — they got it through the December 15th, 1870, date. 
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Q. And on your map, do you — do the records of the county 
reflect that the Denver Rio Grande actually purchased right 
of ways from Tomlinson or his successors in interest? 
A. They did. They purchased both from Thomas Hancock and 
George Tomlinson their strip of grounds that lie immediately 
west of the hundred-foot strip of the Utah Central Railroad. 
Q. Okay. And are those right of ways, were those 
properties that that railroad purchased, are they within the 
400-foot right of way that has been asserted by the Railroad 
or that has been determined to exist by the Court? 
A. Yes, they are. They fall within that 400-foot corridor. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
And have you attached copies of those deeds? 
Yes. They're — 
Which deeds are those? 
Exhibit No. 5. 
Q. Can you explain that document please. 
A. I think itfs --
Q. You donTt have to read it, but if you could just explain 
what it is. 
A. It is a deed — excuse me, No. 5 is not the correct one. 
That's on the other side of the Great Salt Lake and Hot 
Springs Railway Company. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That also falls within the 400-foot corridor somewhat, 
but the Denver and Rio Grande ones are No. 32, No. 33, and 
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No. 34. 
Q. Okay. Let me have you turn to Exhibit 32, if you would 
please. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Would you just — just very — without reading it, would 
you just explain what that — what that conveyance was as 
reflected on the county records. 
A. According to county records, Book H, page 32 of the 
County Recorderfs Office, George and Matilda Tomlinson — 
well, they got George and M. Tomlinson, to the Denver and Rio 
Grande Railroad Company. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And the date was 16th day of May, 1883. 
Q. Okay. And they're conveying to whom? 
A. They are conveying the property to Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad. 
Q. And when you say the property, you1re not referring to 
all the Tomlinson property, you1re referring to this 
property --
A. No, just -- just for that area where the railroad went 
through Tomlinson1s property. 
Q. On the west side of their property, 
A. On the west side of the Utah Central Railroad. 
Q. And Exhibit — what was the other exhibit you referenced 
where property was sold to the Denver and Rio Grande within 
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the 400-foot right of way? 
A. One of them was 33. 
Q. Okay. I think — believe you mentioned 34. 
A. And also, yeah, 34. And those were — those were both 
deeded by Mr. Tom Hancock to the Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company. Properties that also fall within 
the 400-foot corridor. 
Q. Okay. And did Mr. Hancock obtain his interest from Mr. 
Tomlinson? 
A. He — he obtained his interest from Mr. Malcolm McDuff, 
who obtained his interest from George w. Tomlinson. 
Q. And so these — if I understand your testimony 
correctly, the records reflect that the Denver Rio Grande 
Railroad purchased these properties from either Mr. Tomlinson 
or his successor in interest — 
A. That is — 
Q. — as reflected on your map. 
A. That is correct according to the records of the Davis 
County Recorder!s office. 
MR. CALL: Okay. We!d move for the admission of those 
exhibits on the same condition, your Honor. 
THE COURT: 33 and 34 have already been received as part 
of the other testimony relative to the deeds. It was 
limited. I will receive 32 only for the purpose of the 
proffer. 
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Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay, Now, Mr. Elliott, I believe you've 
indicated, and I would just like some further clarification 
as to properties that exist within this 400-foot corridor 
from the Salt Lake County line to the Weber County line. 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe you indicated that there — that you have 
taken the time and have looked at deeds within that corridor 
and patent dates to see if this — the events that occurred 
with respect to Mr. Tomlinson!s property is similar or 
dissimilar to those other properties; is that correct? 
A. That is correct. They — 
Q. What have you — what have you determined? 
A. There's many different ways that they've taken property. 
Some were the homestead, some were through the college funds, 
some even purchased through the same process from the Union 
Pacific Railroad because they owned lands in this area also. 
But it's — but a lot of them are preemptioned, like 
Tomlinsons. And the thing that I noticed most is that, 
again, I stress that the majority of the patents, most of the 
patents, not all of them, but most of them received their 
actual patent from the United States government after 
December the 15th, 1870. 
Q. And do those records, at least the ones that you've 
looked at, do the county records reflect that those 
properties are still privately owned on the records of the 
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county? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. Okay. And is it your opinion as the County Surveyor 
that those properties were not public domain or public ground 
in December of 187 0? 
A. The one they made themself through — most of them took 
from the settler a right of way through there a hundred foot 
wide. 
Q. By purchase? 
A. By purchase. But again, the patent dates fall — fall 
after December 15th, 1870, and unless you go back and request 
from the National Archives the information in relationship to 
that patent, then everything falls into place. They make 
their declaration, they prove up on it, they are possessing 
it, they have neighbors that testify to that, that they1re on 
it and they're having it. And finally, they get the patent, 
but the patent doesn't come immediately. It takes a process 
of time. 
Q. I understand. If -- if a determination were made or is 
made that the patent is the controlling date, could you 
explain to the Court approximately what percentage of ground 
between Salr Lake County and Weber County would be perhaps 
affected by that determination? 
A. I think I'd be safe if I said at least 70 percent would 
be affected by that act. 
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Q. And just for clarification, that is, you're saying that 
the patents on approximately 70 percent of the properties 
between Salt Lake County and Weber County were received after 
the December 15th, 1870 act? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. But that they're treated as private property for 
purposes of the county because of the preemptive or homestead 
or other claims that existed before the patent was issued. 
A. The county doesn't have the records of the archives 
unless they send for them. 
Q. Yeah. 
A. In our office, we've sent for some of those of different 
parcels. I've — as I mentioned before, I'm impressed with 
the records kept by the National Archives. But the patent, 
again, is not the beginning of ownership in this case. It's 
like a contract. It's the conclusion. And if I make a 
contract with you and I follow through all the steps, then I 
am entitled to have that automobile or piece of property at 
the end of that time. And that's what the patent does with 
all these individuals through Davis County. 
Q. And the same is true with Mr. Tomlinson in this case. 
A. Yeah, he's no different. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Except the only difference I can see with Mr. Tomlinson 
is that with all the confusion they did not, or we've never 
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found as of yet, a deed to Utah Central Railroad. But that 
is not enough reason to say itTs not private land. 
Q. Right. And I believe — did you testify before — and I 
apologize if I!ve asked this, but did you indicate that the 
records also indicated that the Utah Central Railroad 
negotiated and actually purchased a portion of the land 
within — that's adjacent from Mr. Tomlinson? 
A. No — well, yeah, it's his land, but they got it from 
another man that declared — made his declaration — a 
declaratory statement, Pomantier — 
Q. Okay. 
A. — and then lost it through — through the Land Office. 
They wouldn't give him land. But yes, they took a deed from 
him for one-half of it through Tomlinsonfs property, Utah 
Central Railroad did. 
Q. So the county records reflect that the Utah Central 
Railroad purchased or purport -- or purchased a deed --
A. From Louis L. Pomantier, yes. 
Q. Okay. As to property that falls within the scope of Mr. 
Tomlinson's land. 
A. Yes, absolutely. 
Q. And that was one of the — I believe — was that one of 
the exhibits that you presented? 
A. It was. 
Q. Can you identify that very quickly so we might have that 
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admitted. 
A. 
the 
I think it's already been admitted, 
THE COURT: Which one is it? 
THE WITNESS: 
Railroad. It 
It's — it's where he 
•s No. 4. 
THE COURT: That has been — 
THE WITNESS: 
THE COURT: 
received. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
THE WITNESS: 
(BY MR. CALL) 
That's No. 4 
Okay. 
THE COURT: 
correct? 
THE WITNESS: 
Railroad, that is 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) 
referenced, is it 
color? 
A. Yes, it's th( 
Right. 
— referred to, but it -
Yeah. 
but I 'm not sure. 
gets the deed from 
— and 
Okay. We — that's No. 4? 
of the exhibit. 
E show that's the Louis deed; 
That's a Louis Pomantier to 
correct, Judge. 
And this, this is the 
has been 
is that 
Utah Central 
deed we've just 
reflected on your chart somewhere in some 
3 one in yellow. It covers one-half of 
Tomlinson's property, north south. 
Q
* 
And so it does actually — the piece that 
Central was purchc 
boundary. 
asing actually is adjacent to 
the Utah 
the Weiser 
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A. That is correct. Again, you need to understand the 
des — excuse me. The descriptions as given back then were 
not tied — as it went through the Utah Central Railroad, 
once in a while I found where they tied it to a section 
corner or a quarter corner. Most the time, like here, they 
just said 50 foot each side of the survey line or center of 
the road through the south half of the northeast quarter of 
Section 14, Township 1 North, Range 1 West. And so they — 
and so we (Unintelligible) where itTs at by the other deeds. 
Q. Okay. And is that generally acceptable in your 
practice — 
A. Well, yes — 
Q. — in these kind of ancient matters? 
A. — because that's really where it's at. And they got 50 
feet each side of it as they went through the — according to 
Pomantier's deed, but Pomantier's deed became non-useful with 
the action of the U.S. Land Surveyor's Office. 
Q. And that's because Mr. Tomlinson's claim was determined 
to be — 
A. Superior. 
Q. — superior to that of Mr. Pomantier. 
A. Yeah, he proved — did everything he had to do to obtain 
that patent. 
MR. CALL: Okay. We would on the same conditions move 
for the admission of Exhibit 4, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Itfs already been received. 
MR. CALL: Okay. May I have just one minute? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. Now, Mr. Elliott, it!s my 
understanding that you've also made some calculations with 
respect — 
THE COURT: Is this still part of the proffer? 
MR. CALL: This is not. 
THE COURT: Okay. I want to give Mr. Devashrayee an 
opportunity to ask any questions as a part of the proffer. 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: (Mr. Devashrayee stands away from the 
microphone and is difficult to hear.) You know, I really — 
I guess I wanna make a comment first just for the record, 
that it be noted that there was a lot of leading going on 
(Unintelligible) legal conclusions made. I object to those 
being made during the proffer, just for the record. As far 
as the actual proffer's concerned and what Mr. Elliott was 
making — or was testifying to, it really becomes a legal 
issue, which I probably (Unintelligible) ask him to assume — 
make some assumptions on my cross-examination. So I think 
that's what I'm gonna do, and I'm gonna leave it at that. 
EXAMINATION 
BY THE COURT: 
Q. Okay. I'm going to ask a few questions because I think 
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the record needs to be clarified. First of all, Mr. Elliott, 
if you'll look at the timeline which you've been referred to 
relative to the preemption and patent process. You testified 
that the act of Congress which created the easement occurred 
on December 15th, 1870; is that right? 
A. That's for Utah Central Railroad. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Other than the declaration statement and the declaration 
of intent to be a U.S. citizen, were there any of those steps 
that had been carried out by Mr. Tomlinson prior to December, 
1870? That's a yes or no question. 
A. I would say — I don't know how to answer yes because — 
or no — 
Q. It's a yes or no question, Mr. Elliott, and I'll — 
A. Okay. 
Q. — just review them with you. Step 1 was the 
declaration statement. 
A. Okay. 
Q. He had made that apparently in 1869, based upon your 
testimony. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. No. 2 was the declaration of intent to be a citizen, 
which was made in 18 69. Step 3 was the proof of preemption. 
That was done, according to your testimony, on July 6th, 
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1872 Statement of no other preemption 
February 6th, 1872. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Is that one -- let me look. ThatT 
Uh-huh. 
Hold on just a minute. 
No, thatfs not No. 6. That's the 
preemption. Your testimony is clearly 
step s that he had taken of all of those 
declaration statement and the intent to 
citizen. Would that be correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
unti 
A. 
thin 
Yes. 
Okay. 
May I — 
No. Itfs a yes or no question. 
Okay. 
Was there — the patent in this ma 
1 when? 
It was — it was -- wefd have to 1 
of claim was 
s number 6? 
statement of 
that the only 
steps was the 
file to 
tter was 
be a 
done 
two 
U.S. 
not issued 
ook for sure, 
k it's September the 25th of !73, but let's 
I don't want — 
Q. 
check 
I think that's what it would indicate, so it was 
after 1870; is that correct? 
A. 
Q. 
indi 
This is correct. 
Anything from the records that you 
cated that any improvements, either 
have reviewed 
the home that 
but I 
that. 
long 
that 
was 
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apparently placed there in — later or the cultivation 
occurred on any of the easement that was included within 
400-foot right of way? Do 
record that you can recall? 
A Can I read — refer to 
refer to No. 6. 
Q 
A. 
You can do that if you 
Okay. This is George 
someone, a citizen, anyway, 
Q I realize that, but is 
that indicates to you where 
acres it was located? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
ir 
ac 
A 
Q 
qi 
The 150.5 acres? 
Uh-huh. 
The home, you mean? 
Yeah. 
Prior to the — 
Or the improvements? 
You mean prior to this 
you have any in: 
that again? I 
!d like to. 
formation from 
think we need 
the 
the 
to 
Tomlinson!s having his neighbor or 
Thomas Hancock 
there anything 
testify --
from that record 
on the what, hundred and some odd 
7 
Yes. Is there anything from the reco: 
idicates where on the hundred and — what 
:res? 
150.5 acres — 
The improvements were 
lestion. 
located. That1 
rd at all that 
is it? 128 — 
3 a yes or no 
- 150 
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A. When you say — now again, rephrase it then. I — 
Q. Were there — is there anything from the record that 
you've seen that indicates where the home or the cultivation 
occurred on that 150 acres? 
A. The cultivation, your Honor, was 50 acres, which was — 
Q. I realize that, but do you know where it was from the 
records? 
A. I can pretty well tell where the home was at, but it's 
after the fact with the next deed. 
Q. Your answer is no then; is that right? 
A. Not — not at December 15th, 1870. 
Q. Okay. Let's — I have a couple of other questions I 
wanna ask — 
A. Okay. 
Q. — because I think the record needs to be clarified. 
It's true that at the time the declaration was filed in 1869, 
based upon your testimony, that there were two other 
competing declarations on the property; is that true? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. The other question I would ask, do you have any 
knowledge of whether or not D. and R.G. Railroad was ever 
granted any kind of an easement along its right of way? 
A. Only by these individuals at that time. I'm looking at 
the old records now. 
Q. I understand, but there was never any act of Congress 
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that gave 
there? 
A. 
Q
* 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
rega. 
upon 
A. 
Q. 
titl< 
A. 
Q. 
at 1( 
No. 
They 
That 
— a. 
Yes. 
Okay 
the D. and R.G. 
That's why they 
had to purchase 
!s right. 
LI of it? 
any kind of right of way, was 
purchased it. 
it, didn't they -
The fourth question is, that I 
rd, the County Recorder!s Office lists 
fee 1 
Most 
title ownership; is that correct? 
— 
have in that 
property based 
of the time that's absolutely correct, yes. 
And records any easement thereon as a 
B; is 
That 
that correct? 
is correct. 
Based upon that in Davis County then < 
sast where Utah Central Railroad goes, 
property < 
Railroad; 
A. 
unde. 
Q. 
They 
r any 
burden on that fee 
and in any county, 
the private 
Dwner would be listed under the easement of the 
is that correct? 
arenft. Do you 
easement of the 
follow what — they're not listed 
Railroad in our . 
So do you exclude all of the easement 
Railroad 
A. 
side 
Q. 
Yes. 
— 
No, ] 
from the private 
records. 
property of the 
property owner in Davis County? 
It does not show that they have 
10, no, what I!m saying, but the ] 
200 feet each 
private property 
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owner goes right up to the Railroad, doesn't he? 
A. Up to the hundred foot, yes. 
Q. It doesn!t show the easement. 
A. That is correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. I have no further questions. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CALL: 
Q. Mr. Elliott — and maybe we need to mark that exhibit. 
I thought you had a document that you referred to that 
indicated that Mr. Tomlinson had been on that property since 
1865; isn!t that correct? 
A. Well, that is true, yeah. 
Q. We'd like to mark that. Do you have that — 
THE COURT: But thatfs not the issue, Mister — 
MR. CALL: Ifd still like to mark that exhibit. It 
shows that — doesn't that show that — 
THE COURT: I think he already has that in the 
evidence — 
THE WITNESS: Well, I think you took it — 
THE COURT: — and he's read from various documents — 
THE WITNESS: I think you took it from me and had it 
entered. 
MR. CALL: I haven't had that entered. You read it and 
I'd like to -- we can mark it during a break, but I'd like to 
just have — 
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THE COURT: You!re welcome to have that in there. I 
have no objection to that. We111 — 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: — make it as part of the proffer. I think 
there is testimony to the effect that he was on the property 
since 1840. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Right. And — and Mister — Mr. Elliott, 
could I just address for just a minute the issue about the 
Land Office? I believe you testified that that Land Office 
in the Territory of Utah had not opened until 18 69; is that 
correct? 
A. Having read recently in the past, it — it indicated the 
Utah office was opened in 1869. 
Q. Okay. And is it your understanding that prior to that 
time, there was nowhere prior to the time that these 
preemptions and so forth were filed in 1869, to your 
understanding of the matter, there was noplace where 
Mr. Tomlinson could have filed anything prior to that time 
with respect to his claim to the property? 
A. I would think not. 
Q. Okay. And is it your opinion and testimony today, Mr. 
Elliott, that the records indicate that Mr. Tomlinson was 
physically on that property prior to 1870? 
A. Again, we can only go by the testimony of Mr. Thomas 
Hancock, and he indicates that he's been there for a long 
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II time. He talks about the number of improvements. I mean, I 
2 think it!s 200 rods of fencing. Thatfs 1897 and a half feet 
3 of fencing. He talks about 50 acres as being cultivated, and 
4 they didnft have a John Deere tractor. You used an oxen or a 
5 horse or a mule. And you — to put 50 acres under 
6 cultivation and plow doesn't happen in a couple of days. 
7 Q. Okay. And with respect to the fact that these — these 
8 documents, some of them that you've looked to, refer to 1840, 
9 what's your understanding with respect to that? Is that the 
10 form that was used or could you give some insight or help to 
11 the Court as to why it's referring to 1840 in some of those 
12 records? 
13 A. I think the reason — this is my opinion. I've looked 
14 at Edmund Webb's and also George Tomlinson's, and they're 
15 both the same — they're almost mirrors of each other as they 
16 go through this process, and they both say since, which means 
17 after the date of 1840. 
18 Q. Okay. Is that — is that — is it your understanding 
19 that there — that the reason that's there is that has 
20 something to do with the 1840 preemption act or something of 
21 that nature? Or what's your understanding as to why that's 
22 cited? 
23 A. Again — again, reading books in relationship to 
24 preemption, they made the law specific so it didn't cover 
25 some squatters that were already on the ground in 1830 and 
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1840. And I think that that was probably their intent when 
they put that date in there. 
Q. So it's not your testimony that he was on the ground — 
it's not your reading of the documents or your opinion that 
hefs asserting that he was on the ground in 1840. 
A. No. It's since. 
Q. Since 1840. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And from the records that you've reviewed, it indicates 
that he was on the ground at least as early as 1865. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Now — and then I believe you also and the Court 
referenced the declaration of his intent to be a citizen of 
the United States; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Is — to your knowledge, is there any reason for that, 
such a declaration to be recorded with the Land Office other 
than to perfect a preemption claim? 
A. That's part of the process. 
Q. Of the preemption process? 
A. He had to do that to get his land. 
Q. Now, Mr. Elliott, it's my understanding that you have 
also performed some calculations to address how much of the 
Weiser property — 
THE COURT: Now, wait a minute. Is that the end of the 
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proffer? 
MR. CALL: Oh, it is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything further, Mr. Devashrayee, as 
far as the proffer? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. That testimony then that — up to 
this point is considered to be part of the proffer, is not to 
be considered by this Court in resolution of the issue that 
is before the Court at this time, but will be a part of the 
record for any purpose subsequent to this. 
MR. CALL: Thank you. 
THE COURT: So now we111 go back to the testimony 
relative to other matters, and you may proceed. 
MR. CALL: Thank you, your Honor. And I just wanna 
indicate to the court, if I might, that we very much 
appreciate that because of the time that's been spent here 
and these -- these new matters, as the Court knows, that 
these records are old and — and it!s not easy to go through 
all of this, and we appreciate the Court's indulgence in 
allowing all of this important evidence to be placed on the 
record for further proceedings, though not for today's issue. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Mr. Elliott, it's my understanding that 
you have also performed a calculation as to the amount of 
property that would — amount of the Weiser property as 
reflected on your map that lies outside of the 400-foot 
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corridor. 
A. Yes. Can I read this? 
Q. Certainly. 
A. I, Max B. Elliott, professional land surveyor, No. 
141269 dash 2201, in the State of Utah, hereby certify that I 
have on this day, Wednesday, December the 7th, 2005, 
calculated the area that is outside the 200 feet from the 
centerline of Utah Central Railroad on the Weiser property. 
(Unintelligible) warranty deed found in Book 1-C, page 519, 
Thomas Hancock and his wife, Sarah Ann Hancock, to Joseph W. 
Mellon. The area equals 2376.66 square feet or 0.0546 acres. 
Q. Okay. Which deeds do you refer — were you referring to 
when you made that opinion? 
A. I was referring to the deed of Mr. Hancock that he and 
his wife deeded to Joseph W. Mellon. 
Q. Could I — I just need to get a number on that so that I 
can move to have that admitted. 
A. It was found in Book 1-C, page 519 of the — 
THE COURT: Have we talked about that deed before now — 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: — Mr. Elliott? What exhibit was it? I'm 
trying to find it here. Was it the No. 5, the Hancock deed? 
THE WITNESS: No. I think — I think we have not 
mentioned it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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THE WITNESS: It's No. 36. Maybe it has been entered. 
Irm not sure. 
THE COURT: It has been entered. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR. CALL: That's thirty — I guess we!d move for the 
admission of 36 outside the proffer. 
THE COURT: It wasn't iss — it wasn't offered in 
conjunction with the proffer. 
MR. CALL: Oh, okay. Thank you, your Honor. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Did you consider — in reaching that 
opinion, did you consider the other deeds that you had — 
which deeds in addition to that deed did you consider — 
A. Again — again, in coming to that conclusion, I looked 
at the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad deed and description 
that is on the west side of the hundred-foot corridor of the 
Utah Central Railroad as per the deeds of Davis County. 
Q. Okay. Which number is — which deed is that? 
I'm sorry, Mr. Elliott, we need to get these admitted 
and we need to know what — which of these documents you have 
relied upon in making your opinion. 
A. I think it's No. 33. I'll look fast and --
THE COURT: It is, and that has already been received. 
MR. CALL: Okay. Outside the proffer? 
THE COURT: Outside the proffer. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. Any of these other deeds that you 
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considered in making that determination? 
A. No, Those two pretty well defined what was shown on the 
rest of the records going through Davis County of the 
hundred-foot corridor, and also the Mellon description 
describes their west line as being the east line of the 
O.S.L. Railroad Line. 
Q. And which exhibit is the Mellow description? 
A. That's the one we just — 
Q. Is that 36? 
A. I think it is. Let me look. 
THE COURT: It is 36. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. From Hancock to Joseph Mellon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Did you — did you look at any other — I guess 
you may have looked at other materials in formulating your 
opinion? They don't necessarily have to be in the record, 
but let me just — 
A. No, I worked strictly — I worked strictly from the 
records of those two descriptions. And the Mellon 
description, although it's old — 
Q. Yes. 
A. — is well written. You don't usually find one that old 
that has that good of closure. 
Q. Okay. So again, in concluding, Mr. Elliott, it's your 
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opinion that there is 2376.66 square feet or .054 — 
A. Sixth acre. 
Q. — sixth acres of property that lies outside of the 
400-foot corridor that's been addressed in this case. 
A. That is correct. 
MR. CALL: Thank you, your honor. That's — that's all 
we have for right now from Mister — 
THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
MR. CALL: -- Elliott. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Thank you, your honor. Move this up a 
little closer. 
THE COURT: It's pretty hard to move. You need to leave 
it right there or you won't be in the video. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Okay. I'm good. I'm fine. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE: 
Q. Morning, Mr. Elliott. 
A. Good morning, Jeff. 
Q. Nice to see you again. Just a few questions really. 
You haven't done a boundary survey. 
A. I have not. 
Q. And Exhibit 1, the plat that you've prepared, that's not 
a survey. 
A. That is not. It's compiled from the records of the 
county. 
nnom A 
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Q. And you haven't been to the property. You haven't 
actually walked the property. 
A. I have not. 
Q. Okay. Let's go ahead and take a look at that Exhibit 1 
for a second. 
May I approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. You may wanna turn it a little bit 
so Max can see it a little better. 
Q. (BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE) All right. (Unintelligible) Mr. 
Elliott. First of all, on this plat, you marked the 200 feet 
width right of way on each side of centerline, correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. And that's referencing the 400-foot land grant — 
A. Of December 15th, 1870, yes. 
Q. I want to make — I want you to make an assumption for 
me, okay? I want you to assume, first of all, that the land 
grant to Utah Central was a valid, effective land grant. 
Okay? Is that fair? Can you make that assumption? 
A. I can make that assumption. 
Q. (Unintelligible) assumption. I want you to also make 
(Unintelligible) — 
A. Understanding that's just an assumption on your part. 
Q. I want you to assume that it's supported by governing 
law, okay? 
MR. CALL: Your honor, I'm gonna have to object to the 
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form of these questions. He!s not asking the witness factual 
issues. He's asking him to make legal conclusions based on 
assumptions. 
THE COURT: Overrule the objection. Go ahead. 
Q. (BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE) I want you to assume that it!s 
supported by governing law, okay? And that the patent date 
is the critical date. Okay? For purposes of 
(Unintelligible) that kind of thing. Is that okay? Is that 
fair? Just make the assumption for me, okay? 
A. I!m having a hard time making the assumption because it 
doesn!t correlate with what I know. 
THE COURT: You don!t have to worry about what you 
know --
THE WITNESS: Okay. All right. 
THE COURT: (Unintelligible) 
THE WITNESS: All right. Making that assumption. 
Q. (BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE) Just make the assumption that it's 
supported, that that 400-foot land grant right of way is 
support by a pronouncement of the United States Supreme 
Court. I want you to make that assumption as well, okay? 
Okay. If we make that assumption, then the only property 
that we have that's depicted on your plat 1 -- on your plat, 
Exhibit 1, is that small triangle — 
A. That — 
Q. — that's outside of the right of way, correct? That 
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Mr. Weiser owns as you (unintelligible), correct? 
A. That would be correct. 
Q. Okay. Now, you know John Stall, correct? 
A. I do know John. 
Q. Okay. You've met him before. 
A. Oh, yeah. I've known John for years. 
Q. Okay. Now, Mr. Stall is — he's done a boundary survey. 
And he's been out to the property, all right? And Mr. Stall 
calculates this square footage outside the 400-foot land 
grant right of way as 1635 square feet, or .0375 acres. 
Would you have any reason to disagree with Mr. Stall's 
conclusions based on the fact that he's been out there and 
he's done a survey? 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, I just have to object to the form 
of the question. This is cross-examination. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I haven't — I have not looked at John's 
survey. I have not looked at John's calculations. And until 
I did that, I couldn't answer that. 
Q. (BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE) Okay. Let me ask you this: It is 
a small area, though. 
A. Yes. 
Q. (Unintelligible) 
A. Yeah, (Unintelligible) not come with much. 
Q. Could I see your — I've never seen that before 
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Q. 
ntelligible). Thank you. And the area you come up 
.66 square feet or .05 (unintelligible) acres, that 
your review of the deeds. 
That is from the deeds, yes, absolutely. 
Okay. Now, we met a couple days ago — 
We did. 
— do you remember that? 
I do. 
And I asked you when we met if you would take any 
exception to where the centerline is depicted in the 
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railroad 
location maps. Do you remember when I asked you that? 
A. 
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And I — and I don't have any problem with that. 
The railroad location maps that are on -- on file with 
Davis County Recorder. 
That's correct. 
You take no issue (Unintelligible). 
I have — I have no issue. 
Okay. 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, I guess I object again. 
well beyond the direct. Hefs asking — 
Th: 
THE COURT: Well, let me indicate that he can call 
as his own witness — 
MR. CALL: Right. 
THE COURT: — and in the interest of time, I'm 
allow him to go beyond that, and you1re — 
Is 
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gonna 
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A. See, we're only talking — and you don't realize how 
small this is. We're not talking a lot of difference between 
1600 and 2300 square feet. 
Q. (Unintelligible) 
A. It's not much property. 
THE COURT: Mr. Elliott, you need to understand, it 
isn't much, but that's why we're here. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: But — but there again, I would think that 
probably if he has — if he come up with a survey out there 
on the ground that was two feet different than mine, my 
calculations from the deed, it would easily create with the 
distance that I calculate down along that sliver on the 
west — on the westerly side of what's outside of the 400 
feet — you follow me? 
Q. (BY MR. DEVASHRAYEE) Right. 
A. If he was off two or three feet in reality out there on 
the ground from the de — from the record, it would add up 
probably to six, seven, eight hundred feet alone, square 
feet. 
Q. Okay. Just let me confirm. 
A. Okay. 
Q. First of all, I want you to assume — you say you'd take 
no exception with the centerlines depicted on the railroad 
1 location maps, correct? 
2 A. Yeah, because they1re just a map. 
3 Q. Okay. (Unintelligible) Okay. And let's say that 
4 Mister — let!s say that Mister — 
5 A. And let me — let me say — 
6 Q. No, hold on, Mr. Elliott. Letfs just assume that Mr. 
7 Stall relied on those railroad location maps to determine the 
8 centerline, okay? And that he's been out to the property, 
9 okay? And let's also — I'm gonna tell you that Mr. Stall 
10 really takes no exception to your eastern boundary of that — 
11 that small triangle representing, as we're calling it, the 
12 outside property or the property that Mr. Weiser's claiming, 
13 okay? If that's true, if he agrees — if he essentially 
14 agrees with you on that boundary and he's taking the 
15 centerline from the railroad location maps and his own 
16 walking of the property, would you have any reason to dispute 
17 his calculation of 635 square feet? 
18 A. I wouldn't answer that until I looked at his survey and 
19 his notes and calculated it myself. I've seen too many times 
20 that surveyors have not been correct. 
21 Q. Okay. And we're agreeing, though, it's a very small 
22 piece of property. 
23 A. Yeah, absolutely. 
24 MR. DEVASHRAYEE: I'm done. Thank you, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Redirect. 
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MR. 
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: Thank you, Jeff. Thanks, Steve. 
Anything else you need? Got all your stuff? 
f our exhibits. 
: If I get it all, I'll be lucky. 
Okay. 
: Thank you. 
Call your next witness please 
Can I have just one — 
Sure. 
May we just take a minute break, your Honor? 
Sure, we'll take a ten-minute break. We'll 
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be back at 11:10. 
(The Court took a brief recess.) 
THE COURT: We're back in session. Parties and counsel 
are present. You may call your next witness, Mr. Call. 
MR. CALL: Your honor, if I just may indicate to the 
Court that the during the break, we have met, Mr. Devashrayee 
and Ms. Peck and I, and we have settled this issue with 
respect to the property. And we have stipulated that the 
property that lies outside of the 400-foot corridor is 2000 
square feet. And that I'll just indicate is just a 
compromise between the 2377 feet testified to by Mr. Elliott 
and the 1635 square feet that would have been testified to by 
Mr. Stall. 
And we've agreed that for purposes of that calculation, 
that the centerline is the centerline that was indicated by 
Mr. Stall in his document, but that centerline stipulation is 
for that purpose and not for purposes of altering or changing 
any of the testimony with respect to the deeds and the 
records that were — that was — that was testified to by 
Mister — 
THE COURT: The proffered — 
MR. CALL: The proffer --
THE COURT: — information. 
MR. CALL: — yes. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Your Honor, can I just for the record, 
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I wanna specify the centerline that Mr. Stall specified. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: It is — the centerline is located 
366.62 feet east of the quarter corner common to Sections 11 
and 14. 
THE COURT: Section 11 and 14? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Sections 11 and 14. Right, John? Or 
in other words, it's coincident with track No. 1 as shown on 
the maps. And we just figured, your Honor, we're talking 
about such a small piece of property, that it!s not gonna 
matter much in terms of the rest of the issues that — we 
figured that'd make you happy. 
THE COURT: It does make me happy, and shows that you 
are, as I believed all along, reasonable counsel when it gets 
right down to it. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Your Honor, could I say one other — 
Steve will agree here — 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: — just — just because we stipulate 
to this, it doesn't mean — you know, we still have issues 
of, you know, he still has his claims of trespass, forcible 
detainer. We of course disagree with that. There's still 
issues of why we're out on that property to begin with. That 
has already been briefed. And then there's the issue of 
valuation. It's after that, assuming that Mr. Weiser 
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ll prevails on those claims, so we got a couple more steps to 
2 take, but this is a big one and now we can move on. 
3I THE COURT: It does appear to be a significant one and 
4 that we can move on to these other issues that I'm not sure 
5 are any less complicated, but at least we have a beginning 
6 point on those matters. Are we able to go on — forward on 
7 any of those at this time? 
8 MR. CALL: I don't believe so. What we would like to 
9 do, your Honor, is that — is maybe agree on a briefing 
10 schedule on some of the issues. I think before we address 
11 damages and the trespass issues, we'd like an opportunity to 
12 file a motion with the Court setting forth the points and 
13 authorities that — and the legal research that we have 
14 gathered with respect to the effect of the preemption issue. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. I am not gonna consider that, 
16 Counsel. I've already ruled on that particular issue. I've 
17 given you the opportunity to take the record. That should 
18 have been before the Court a long time ago if you wanted to 
19 raise those issues. I'm not gonna preclude you from keeping 
20 them a part of the record so that as you wanna go up on 
21 appeal, it's there, but I am not gonna reconsider that issue. 
22 MR. CALL: But we would like at least the opportunity to 
23 file a motion and have it denied so that the Court of Appeals 
24 doesn't — doesn't say, well, you should have filed your 
25 motion under Rule 52 — 
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THE COURT: I have denied your motion right now, so you 
don't need to go to the briefing expense. I've — I'll rule 
from the bench that I've already considered that matter. 
I've ruled on it, and I'll deny your motion to reconsider 
because I think that's what it is. 
MR. CALL: I guess the concern that we would have, your 
Honor, and if he could just as a procedural matter, if we 
could just identify those issues, we could set it out in just 
a very brief document so that it's in the record, so that 
there isn't the assertion that we're trying to raise new 
issues on appeal. Because it didn't come into evidence here, 
we like — if we could just file that document. But with 
that said, we'll just do that to preserve the record and then 
the Court can promptly deny it and — and it's denied 
already, but we'll just lodge that — 
THE COURT: I have no objection to your doing that. 
MR. CALL: — filing that and then — 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: So I have to respond to it now? 
THE COURT: If you want to respond, you can, but you 
don't have to because I've already denied it. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, the other thing is that — 
that leaves the issue as to damages relative to this property 
that we're talking about. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Well, no, your Honor. Still — we 
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still have to — they to get worthy (Unintelligible). 
THE COURT: ITm saying that, but what I'm saying is, to 
me, you've got an issue that is subject to being settled 
between the parties. All right? You know what you1re 
talking about now. And so my encouragement is that you get 
together and see if you can resolve that issue. If in fact 
you can resolve that issue, we can enter a judgment, and we 
could reserve the issue relative to this preemption issue if 
you want to appeal that. But it could resolve this other 
matter — you know, even looking at some of these things 
we're talking about, the question becomes whether or not you 
can really justify going ahead and expending more time on the 
question of damage. Really, itfs not a significant matter 
unless somehow that preemption issue is found to be valid. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Yes. 
THE COURT: That's what I — that's where I really think 
we are in this matter. And so I would just ask you to look 
at it from that perspective, see if you want to — you can 
come to a resolution of that damage issue, and even if — 
like I say, if you want to reserve for the purposes of appeal 
the preemption issue, you can do that. But you may wanna 
look at it from that perspective. But I would like to set a 
cutoff time like — this has been languishing for a long 
time, my fault, you fault, all of us. We need to get this 
resolved. And so what I will do, I'd like to give you some 
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time to see if you can resolve it. Will 30 days be enough 
time to let you look at it? We're into the holidays and I 
know it's a difficult time, but Ifll give you what time you 
need, but I just want to move it along and get it resolved. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Could I have more time? I 
(Unintelligible) lot of time to dedicate to this issue for 
the next 30 — could we have 60 days? 
THE COURT: It!s up to you two — 
MR. CALL: We!d go even — 
THE COURT: We!ve been going for 12 years. Havenft we? 
MR. CALL: What's a few more. Yeah, we'd go — why 
don!t we go through the end of February. 
THE COURT: Could you get my — Val, could you go get my 
2006 calendar? 
MR. CALL: We would, your Honor — in order to determine 
the issue of value, we had previously talked about and had 
requested copies of the records showing how much the property 
had been sold for. And the Court reserved on that. Wanted 
to determine if there was any property that lied outside of 
the right of way. In light of the fact that the parties have 
stipulated that there is indeed property that's outside of 
the right of way, we would like to receive copies of those 
documents so we can see what this — we believe it was an 
arm's length transaction between the Railroad and the State 
of Utah. We'd like to see those documents — 
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THE COURT: Well — 
MR. CALL: — so we can see the values. 
THE COURT: — the only concern I have about that is 
we're talking about such a small portion. I'm not sure I'm 
willing to let you look at that. Mr. Devashrayee, what's the 
position of the defendant in this matter? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: I'm didn't --I'm sorry, I didn't hear 
the first part of it. What were you wanting? 
THE COURT: They wanna know how much you paid for the 
property. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: I don't want (unintelligible) that's 
irrelevant. I'm not gonna give you those documents. 
THE COURT: It is — you know, the issue is — issue is 
not right now. The issue is when this matter was filed in 
1991. 
MR. CALL: Well, I would agree — 
THE COURT: We're talking about value. 
MR. CALL: I would agree with the issue of the value at 
that time except that Mr. Weiser's still the owner of the 
property that lies outside, and if there's been a purported 
sale of that property today, that's still his property. That 
evidence would be relevant to damages. 
THE COURT: At this point I will not allow it to be 
discovered. All right? Go from there, and if I think 
there's some reason to look at it, I'll be glad to do that. 
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But at this point, I111 deny that request. 
Let's set a schedule. And you are right, if it's a 
continuing trespass, damage would be relevant, but at this 
point, I'm gonna deny that request. 
I'll give you — if you want 60 days, what if I give you 
until the 10th of February to see what you can work out on 
the matter. Is that enough time? 
MR. CALL: I believe we indicated if we could have 
through the end of February. 
THE COURT: Do you want that — you know, I'll let you 
set the schedule — 
MR. CALL: The end of February's fine. 
THE COURT: — as long as we've got a schedule, all 
right? So we'll go — I'll give you until the end of 
February, which is the 28th, as a period of settlement. We 
have the issues remaining that have been indicated. My 
question would be, do you wish further evidentiary hearing on 
those issues or do you consider them primarily to be ones 
of — of subject to briefing and maybe you could reach 
stipulated facts? It's up to you, I'll do it either way. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Your Honor, I have already briefed 
these issues in my brief (unintelligible) out. It's called 
brief of property regarding property — 
THE COURT: I think we've briefed all the issues in this 
case several times. 
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MR. DEVASHRAYEE: And if Steve wants to brief them 
again, I guess we can, but I'm content for you just to rule 
from the brief. 
MR. CALL: Yeah, I think that we have briefed the 
issues. Our claims are: We claim for quiet title, an 
issue — and order for restitution as to that part of our 
property that allows that — lies outside, we've got a 
forcible detainer claim, we have a treble damages claim, an 
intentional trespass claim, a claim for unjust enrichment, 
and a claim for punitive damages on that little parcel. So I 
guess what we would anticipate would be giving — having an 
evidentiary hearing. We've already briefed out the liability 
issues, and there's no dispute as to possession or the amount 
of property that's outside, so we'd be talking just the 
numbers with respect to those claims. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Guess we could have an evidentiary 
hearing on — on those issues. I mean I would present 
evidence and am prepared to even at this hearing, although I 
know that wasn't — I didn't know how far the Court was gonna 
go, but I was gonna show -- I have exhibits that were gonna 
indicate no chain of our title to that property. 
THE COURT: This is from UDOT that you're claiming? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Right, exactly. Now, that's in the 
form of an affidavit, so the evidence is in. So I'm not 
sure -- maybe just an ordinarily hearing without having to be 
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evidentiary, that may be good enough. 
THE COURT: Well, I!11 tell you what I'm gonna do. I'm 
gonna continue it. I'll give you until the end of February 
to see what you can do about resolving it. At that time, I 
will get you two on a conference call and we'll set up a 
schedule for how we're gonna handle the balance — 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Okay. 
MR. CALL: (Unintelligible) 
THE COURT: — of the case. And between now and then 
it'll give you a chance to sift through and see what you 
really think's viable and maybe not so viable, and we can 
boil it down to the issues that are really relevant before 
us. 
Let me indicate, when's the best time — it's best for 
me to make conference calls on Tuesday morning because I — 
that's my civil law and motion calendar. What I would 
propose, that I call you two on February 28th in the morning 
sometime and that we check the status on the matter. If 
you're able to resolve things before then and we need a 
conference call or you wanna submit pleadings, you're welcome 
to do that, but just so we stay on track. We'll have a 
conference call on the 28th of February. What's the best 
time of the day for you? 
MR. CALL: Ten o'clock. 
THE COURT: How about you, Mr. Devashrayee? 
88 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: That's fine. 
THE COURT: We111 call at ten ofclock on that date. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Thatfs a Tuesday? 
THE COURT: That's 28th of February, that's a Tuesday. 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Okay. 
THE COURT: I would like, Mr. Call, for you to submit an 
order in conjunction with today's hearing relative to the 
stipulation and the agreement. 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: Also, you can include in that the motion 
that youTve made for the Court to reconsider the — the 
preemption issue, and that I have denied that request. Send 
a copy of that to Mr. Devashrayee at least five days before 
it's submitted to me for signature. 
And just let me say to counsel, I have appreciated all 
the work you've done on this trying to educate the Court. It 
seems to be a simple factual issue, but there are a lot of 
facts that are of relative ancient origin that are important 
in this matter. And so I think that's one of the reasons I 
think counsel have tried to resolve the matter to see if 
something could be resolved that would be amenable to each of 
the parties. We're still trying to do that, but if we fail 
in that, we'll get it resolved for you sometime in the 
spring, so — all right? Hope Mr. Weiser's doing well — 
MR. CALL: Thank you. 
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THE COURT: — the whole exhibit. Is that agreeable? 
MR. DEVASHRAYEE: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 92 PAGES OF 
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY AS A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 8th DAY OF March, 2008. 
DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
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[G-ENEBAJL NATURE—Uo. 2.J 
AN ACT granting* to the Utah Central Railroad Company a right of way through the 
public lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph. 
Be it enacted by tlie Senate arid Souse of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the right of way through 
the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to the Utah Cen-
tral Bailroad Company, a corporation created under the laws of the 
legislative assembly of the Territory of Utah, its successors and assigns, 
for the construction of a railroad and telegraph from a point at or near 
Ogden City, in the Territory of Utah, to Salt Lake City, in said Terri-
tory.,- and the right, power, and authority is hereby givfcn to said 
corporation to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said 
road material of earth, stone, timber, and so forth, for the construction 
thereof! Said way is'granted to said railroad to the extent of two hun-
dred feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may pass 
through the public domain, including all necessary ground for station-
buildings, work-shops, depots, machine-shops, switches, side-tracks, 
turn-tables, and water-stations: Provided, That within three months 
from the passage of this act the said Utah Central Bailroad Company 
shall file with the Secretary of the Interior a map to be approved by 
him, exhibiting the line of the railroad of said company, as the same 
has been located and constructed: Provided furtlier', That said company 
shall not charge the Government higher rates than they do individuals 
for like transportation and telegraphic service. And it shall be the duty 
of the Utah Central Bailroad Company to permit any other railroad, 
which has been of shall be authorized to be built by the United States, 
or by the legislature of the Territory-of Utah, to form running connec-
tions with its road on fair and equitable terms. 
SEC. 2. And be it furtlier enacted*, That the United States make the 
grants herein, and that the said Utah Central Bailroad Company accepts 
the same, upon the express condition that the said company shall not 
exercise the power given by section ten of chapter sixteen of the laws 
of the Territory of Utah, approved February nineteenth, eighteen hun-
dred and sixty-nine; and upon the further express condition that if the 
said company make any breach of the conditions hereof, then in such 
case, at any time hereafter, the United* States, by its Congress, may do 
any and all acts and things which may be needful and necessary for the 
enforcement of such conditions. — : ~;" 
SEC. 3. And be it furtlier enacted, That said Utah Central Bailroad shall 
be a post route and a military road, subject to the use of the United 
States for postal, military, naval, and all other Government service, and 
also subject to such regulations as Congress may impose, restricting the 
charges for such Government transportation. 
SEC. L- And be it furtlier enacted*, That the acceptance of the terms, 
conditions, and impositions of this act, by the said Utah Central Bailroad 
Company, shall be signified in writing under the corporate seal of said 
company, duly executed pursuant to the direction of its board of 
directors first had'and obtained, which acceptance shall be made within 
three months after the passage of this act, and shall be served on the 
President of the United States; and if such acceptance and service shall 
not be so made, this grant shall be void. 
SEC. 5. And be it furtlier enacted, That Congress may at any time, 
having due regard for the rights of said Utah Central Bailroad Com-
pany, add to, alter, amend, or repeal this act. 
Approved, December 15,1870. 
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DECLARATION OF INTENTION, 
To Become a Citizen of the United States 
I, George Tomlinson do declare, on oath, that it is bona fide my intention to become a 
Citizen of the United States of America, and to renounce and abjure forever, all allegiance and 
fidelity, to all and any Foreign Prince, Potentate, State and Sovereignty whatever, and 
particularly to Victoria, Queen of Great Britain and Ireland of whom I was a subject. 
Sworn and subscribed to before ) 
me, at my office, at Salt Lake City, this ) 
3 rddayofMay,A.D. 1869. ) 
Patrick Synch Clerk of the U.S. 3rd District Court, in and for the Territory 
of Utah, do certify that the above is a true copy of the Original Declaration of Intention of 
George Tomlinson to become a Citizen of the United States of America, remaining on record in 
my office. 
In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto subscribed 
my name and affixed the Seal of said Court, at my office in 
Salt Lake City in said District this 3rd day of May, A.D. 
1869 
Patrick Synch, Clerk 
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DECLARATION OF INTENTION, 
To Become a Citizen of -the United States. 
£-# -J.-
do declare, on oath, 
that itis bona fide my intention to become a Citizen of the United 
States of America, and to renounce and abjure forever, ail allegiance 
and fidelity, to all and any Foreign Prince, Potentate, State aild 
Sovereignty whatever, and particularly to»^4^k^^^^^^^..^L^ 
Jptt^ I was a subject. 
SWOEK and subscribed to before ^  
me, at my office, at# 
. J L a ^ , A. D. 1802 
*il<^5S!fc -Clerk of the U. 8, 
%U£LJZ3ZZ^„ „Court, in and for the Territory of Utah. 
Clerk of the U 8. 
c ^ b ^ ^ ^ Court, iiTand for the Territory of Utah, do 
trug cp] certify that the aljoye is a t py of the Original Declaration of 
Intention o i L « ^ p ^ become a 
"Citizen of the tTnited States of America, remaining on record in 
my office* 
IN TESTIMONY WHJSHEOF, I have here-
unto subscribed my name, and affixed the 
Seal of SAM Court, at my office, iiiwC£<s^<£~ 
in said^M.!^^^<^^^;. 
thi&N^&^L.M.,.^—*.—day olL4dbuR2d£&MMM—,. 
A. D. 186&1 
Jfawf Print 
Cfer^. 
fc& 
m 
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I, Thomas Hancock, a citizen of the U.S. and of lawful age do solemnly swear that I am 
well acquainted with George Tomlinson who is a naturalized citizen of the U.S. and the head of a 
family consisting of a wife and 1 child and is an inhabitant of the NE of NW lA of Lots 2 and 
West lA of NE quarter of Section No. fourteen (14) of Township No. one (1) North, of Range No. 
one (1) west and that no other person resided upon the said land, entitled to the right of pre-
emption; that the said George Tomlinson entered upon and made a settlement in person on the 
said land since the first day of June, 1840, to wit: on the 17th day of April, 1871; and has erected 
thereon a log house 14x16 feet with roof, floor, door and windows and is a comfortable house 
to live in and has lived in the said house, and made it his exclusive home, from the 17th day of 
April, 1871, till the present time; that he did not remove from his own land, within the State of 
Utah, to make the settlement above referred to; and that he has, since said settlement, plowed, 
fenced, and cultivated about 50 acres of said land and has thereon 115 rods fencing. 
Thomas Hancock 
I, , Receiver do hereby certify that the above affidavit was taken and 
subscribed before me, this 6 day of February, A.D. 1872. 
, Receiver 
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r^ 
/* 
W^t ^^^_.g2><^L -^^ ^ r^^ ^ ^^ S^^ -^ .^ ^^ XS^ f^l—jCtC-^ - .e«<£&b£^ 
do solemnly swear 
w„^£&-&t*~lr^C<Z' C* 
..c%je^&*2<x>64£~***..* <ijti-&&ii£&L".— 
T£9MsCtl£<^^ f* '* 
^^u..^m^.~£u^ - ~~y~~ -rj~ • -^ ^ ^ / ^ W y ^ U ! : <?~*S 
ad is an inhabitant of the _^ .^ .«^ .v^ - J^^ - - f^^^^ ' -»^S^- . - qwhr of Sectio-
d^M^^i^J-~~(^^ of Township '. ££-}. — North, of Range 
!0. _JU and that no other person resided upon 
le said land, entitled to the right of pre-emption; that tba said : ^ £ * 5 a ^ ^ 
facnsLt^TTZL entered upon and.made'a settlement in person on the said land sinco 
lie ,„M.„rf£<Lt^jk.^ day of .^..ykzfe*^^ l&4*a , to wit: on the . 
f CL^r^ » ^ tyf • —^fc**^_Atffc*—«*fc&rf&!!efc^^ jSiJL 
<£EZX*Z**£^.J&!^^ 1&*ak&*c£^c**.—4GMZ. di&Wkijfi 
4uL^.«£jfrsUzA.—«&**€* ..... . - . « . . — . .———.—•.«• 
md has lived in the oaid houre, and made it his exclusive home, from the „. /./t...,^*:. day 
>f /Z2rf^.c<&. '—• 18 /V , till the present time; that ha did not remove from his own land, 
ivithin the SuSo"of $*&&&&& », to raakotho settlement above referred to; and that he 
jas, since said settlement., plowed, fenced, and cultivated about ^j£3l . acres of said 
and *s&*e-*£^~^^ 
. 
_ . . . j £ c g ^ ^ % 2 ^ ^ i^^G^lg^S^ 
^ 
• 
' 
I tCirfanA. Iz^a&ttetey.^.. di> hereby certify that tlic above affidavit 
*£k*£a*^ , A. D. 187 
i - -r 
was taken and'subscribed beforo'mo, this &..zzz~.„ 
WE certify' that 
subscribed to the foregoing affidavit, . person of respectability. 
., Register, 
TabF 
No. 742 Land Office at Salt Lake City, Utah February 6th, 1872 
It is hereby certified, That, in pursuance of Law, George Tomlinson, Salt Lake County, 
Territory of Utah on this day purchased of the Register of this Office, the Lot or West lA of North 
East North East of Northwest lA and lot 2 of Section No. fourteen in Township No. (1) one 
North of Range No. containing one hundred fifty and 50/100 acres, at the rate of two 
dollars and fifty cents per acre, amounting to three hundred and seventy-six dollars and twenty-
five cents for which the said George Tomlinson has made payment in full as required by law. 
Now, therefore, be it known, That, on presentation of this 
certificate to the COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, the said George 
Tomlinson shall be entitled to receive a Patent for the Lot above described. 
, Register 
848554 
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No. 742 Receiver's Office at Salt Lake City Feb 1872 
Received from George Tomlinson of Salt Lake County, Utah the sum of Three Hundred 
and Seventy-Six dollars and Twenty-Five cents; being in Ml for the West lA of NE lA and North 
East lA of North West lA and Lot Two (2) quarter of Section No. Fourteen in Township No. One 
(1) North of Range No. One (1) West containing one hundred and fifty acres and fifty 
hundredths, at $2. per acre. 
$376.25 , Receiver 
tf)V-14-2005 HON 04:00 PH /IS CO SURVEYOR 80145. ,3 P. 10 
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PROOF OF RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION OF GEORGE TOMLINSON 
I, George Tomlinson, claiming the right of pre-emption under the provisions of the act of 
Congress entitled "An act to appropriate the proceeds of the public lands, and to grant pre-
emption rights,'5 approved September 4, 1841, to the NE NW lA Lot 2 of Section number 14 of 
Township number 1 North, or Range number 1 East, subject to sale at the Land Office at Salt 
Lake City, do solemnly swear that I have never had the benefit of any right of pre-emption under 
this act; that I am not the owner of three hundred and twenty acres of any land in any State or 
Territory of the United States, nor have I settled upon and improved said land to sell the same on 
speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to my exclusive use or benefit; and that I have not, 
directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, in any way or manner, with any person or 
persons whatsoever, by which the title which I may acquire from the government of the United 
States should inure, in whole or in part, to the benefit of any person except myself. 
George X Tomlinson 
I, Geo. R. Maxwell, Register, of the Land Office Salt Lake City, Utah, do hereby certify 
that the above affidavit was taken and subscribed before me, this 6th day of July, A.D. 1872. 
Geo. R. Maxwell, Register 
-14-2005 HON 03:59 PH DAVIS CO S JOR 8014513233 J6 
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$>. <L t<yVpUr5^J29l^ ~ , claiming the right of pro-emption 
tho provisions of the act o( Congress, onfcillcd "An act to appropriate tho proceeds of the public 
and to grant pie-emption najilV approved September 4, 1841, lo IhoKftft^ngft 
tr d Beclioa number _ / L f ^ , of Township number yC
 MM „ , North, of • 
i number / -(£-, y? subject to sale at tho Land Office at .„ „ ,„„ „ 
». CJ^^^^e^c^ %D&zzL , do solemnly a wear that I have never had 
snofifc of any light of pie-emption under this act; that I am not the owner of throe hundred and 
/ acroa or any land m any State ot Territory of the United States, nor havo I settled upon and 
vod soul land to sell tho s-nmo on speculation, but in good faith to appropriate xt to my exclusive 
benefit; and that I have not, diroctly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract, in anyway 
inner, with any person or persons whatsoever, by which tho title which I may acquire from tho 
nnent of the United States should inure, in whole or in part, to the benefit of any person except 
f. Sl& *^^"s7^ 
^uXZtf&i£ 
and subscribed befoi e mo, tlm 
fe&£t^L<(L. -61^J&<!^ , of the Land Office _ _< 
- - £ 3 * : . . . day of 
_ , do hei oby certify that the above affidavit was 
f A.D. 187 ^r 
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STEVEN W. CALL (A5260) 
RAY, QU1NNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Ste. 1400 
Salt LakeCity, Utah 84111 
Tel. (801) 350-1500 
Fax (801) 532-7543 
ELIZABETH M. PECK (A6304) 
LAW OFFICE OF ELIZABETH M. PECK 
422 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Tel. (801) 521-0844 
JN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN C. WEISER, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 910749302 
Hon. Rodney S. Page 
Plaintiff Glen C. Weiser (the "Plaintiff')., by and through counsel, hereby gives NOTICE 
OF APPEAL of the Second Judicial District Court's various Rulings, Orders and Judgments 
made final by that certain Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment entered 
herein on December 21,2007. 
In addition, Plaintiff gives notice of appeal, inter alia, with regard to the following 
rulings, orders and/or judgments: 
1) The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and Judgment entered on 
December 21,200 7 
2) TMs Court's reconsideration of its grant of partial summary judgment to Plaintiff 
upon [ 3 PR R 's ]\ lotion, and this Coi irt's October 19 2001 reversal,, of 1,1 s grant of partial 
summary judgment to Plaintiff and award of partial summary judgment to UPRR on 
the gioiiiick nl'.ww/v </i eisis diid Link ni Plainlilf s sliintiiiij.; 1i> challenge the 
Conditional Grant; 
3) This Court's rejection of Plaintiffs arguments that the Court should have analyzed 
the issues in the case under the doctrines ofres judicata and collateral estoppel and 
its determination that neither legal doctrine was binding in this case; 
. - • t 's October !,.,, 2001 r ill i ng that the Condition a! Grant wa s \ al id ,, and that 
pursuant to the Conditional Grant, a fee or limited fee interest in the subject property 
was conveyed to U PKK and ibal Plaintiff Iwid no hinmimii); nitti'esl in the piopuly; in 
so ruling, the Court concluded that UPRR owned the subject property and rejected 
Plaintiff's argument that the Conditional Grant conveyed only a right-of-way to 
UPRR's predecessor in interest. 
5) Ilii s Coi irt's October 1, 2001 ruling which concluded that the subject property was 
part of the "public lands" at the time the Conditional Grant was approved by 
arguments and evidence that the property was taken out of the public lands by virtue 
of Plaintiff s original predecessor'1 s homestea ci or pre-emption intere st in, the property. 
6) This Court's conclusion and ruling that the Utah Fourth District Court's 1935 Decree 
Quieting Title in favor of Plaintiff's predecessor was not dispositive or binding upon 
this Court's determination that the subject property belongs to UPRR. 
to another third party did not cause the property to revert to Plaintiff, nor was UPRR's 
conveyance ul'iJic pinpLTly (o LIIJOIJICJ' conclusive (i\ idem c of its intent lo remise or 
release its interest in the property. The Court ruled and ordered that UPRR's limited 
fee interest did not revert back to the United States and then transfer forward to 
Plaintiff, and in so ruling, the Court rejected Plaintiff's contention that if the 
conveyance of the property was a limited fee conveyance, then it was subject to a 
reverter to the I Jnited Stales and forward passage to Pla i nti ff throu ghh is chain of 
title. 
8) This Court's December 21,2007 Order dismissing Plaintiff s claims with prejudice 
for relief for quiet title, restitution, forcible detainer, treble damages, trespass and 
unjust enrichment 
9) The Court's ruling that the evidence and exhibits presented at trial by the plaintiff on 
December 8,2005 that the subject property was not part of the public lands were 
irrelevant and tin* ("'null's iilliinatt' conclusion urn! ruling at thai hem nig lhal flu: 
plaintiffs property was part of the public lands at all relevant times. 
10) The Court's ruling which precluded discovery as to the purchase of the subject 
property which was sold by the defendant 
11) The Court's rulings on the applicability of the pre-emption doctrine. 
DATED this \& day of January, 2008. 
RAY QUINNE \ As NEBEKER 
f^i/i^, i^ 
Elizabeth M. Peck 
('» ( nun H fin I'l unliff < il n WHscr 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify tiny oflS1'1 day ofjmiujiry. 'HMW. a tnio and torred. eopv of NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Jeffery J. Devashrayee 
280 South 400 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
964707 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Glen C. WEISER, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 950471. 
Feb. 14, 1997. 
Individual who claimed ownership of property on which railroad had built facility brought action to 
quiet title. The Second District Court, Farmington Department, Rodney S. Page, J., entered partial 
summary judgment in favor of individual, and certified judgment as final for purposes of appeal. 
Railroad appealed, and the Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that matter involved only single claim, 
even though multiple issues were involved, and thus could not be certified as final. 
Appeal dismissed. 
West Headnotes 
[1J 13 KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
0^106 Courts 
€^1061 Nature, Extent, and Exercise of Jurisdiction in General 
o»106k37 Waiver of Objections 
ps-106k37(2) k. Time of Making Objection. Most Cited Cases 
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at anytime by either party or by court. 
[ 2 ] H KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
o*30 Appeal and Error 
c—30III Decisions Reviewable 
<^ 30111(D) Finality of Determination 
€^30k75 Final Judgments or Decrees 
c^30k80 Determination of Controversy 
o»30k80£(3} k. Determination of Part of Controversy. Most Cited Cases 
0^30 Appeal and Error m KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote 
€^30VII Transfer of Cause 
c-30VII(B) Petition or Prayer, Allowance, and Certificate or Affidavit 
c^30k366 k. Certificate as to Grounds. Most Cited Cases 
Quiet title action in which grant of partial summary judgment was made involved only single claim 
for relief, and thus, could not be certified for as final for purpose of appeal; while several issues were 
presented by different legal theories asserted, only one claim existed, that of ownership of disputed 
property. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 54(b). 
*596 Steven W. Call, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Morris O. Haggerty, J. Clare Williams, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
*597 HOWE, Justice: 
Union Pacific Railroad Company appeals from a partial grant of summary judgment in this quiet 
title action holding invalid Union Pacific's claim, under the Conditional Land Grant Act of 1870, to a 
400-foot-wide right-of-way centered on its tracks in Davis County, Utah, which overlaps property 
claimed by plaintiff Glen C. Weiser. 
In 1873, Weiser's most remote predecessor in interest purportedly received title to the disputed 
land through a federal land grant patent issued by President Ulysses S. Grant. In 1935, the district 
court for Davis County quieted title to the disputed property in Roelof Steenblik, one of Weiser's 
predecessors in interest. All known entities with a possible claim to the property were made parties to 
that action. The Railroad was not made a party because there was no public record of its interest. The 
Railroad did receive constructive notice by publication, however. In 1982, Union Pacific began 
construction of a semi-truck loading facility on the disputed property. In 1987, Weiser discovered the 
Railroad's use of the property and through counsel requested the Railroad to surrender and vacate 
the property. The Railroad refused, and Weiser had Associated Title Company prepare a title report, 
which showed that Weiser owned the property in fee simple. He again made a formal demand that 
the Railroad surrender and vacate the property. Union Pacific again refused. Plaintiff brought this 
action to gain possession of and to quiet title to the property. Union Pacific counterclaimed, 
contending that the United States had granted its predecessor in interest, Utah Central Railroad, a 
400-foot-wide "right-of-way through public lands for the construction of a railroad and telegraph" in 
March of 1870. One of the conditions of the grant was that within three months after the passage of 
the 1870 Act, the Railroad file with the Secretary of Interior a map approved by him "exhibiting the 
line of said company, as the same has been located and constructed." The parties dispute whether 
this condition was fulfilled. Weiser contends that because the Railroad did not timely file a certified 
map that was accepted by the Secretary of Interior, the Railroad's grant of right-of-way fails. 
£1] m After extensive research and historical analysis, the trial court granted a partial summary 
judgment that the grant to the Railroad failed for lack of condition. The court certified its partial 
summary judgment as final under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and explicitly "reserved for 
further proceedings the parties' other claims in the case, including their claims of title based upon 
other theories of law and/or equity." Weiser opposed the motion for certification and now argues that 
this court lacks jurisdiction because "[ t ]he Partial Summary Judgment entered by the Trial Court is 
not an order which can be certified final under Rule 54(b)." He offers no support for his contention. 
However, "a lack of [subject matter] jurisdiction can be raised at any time by either party or by the 
court." Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Distf 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986); see also Petersen v. Utah 
Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Utah 1995). 
£21 H In Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991), we 
reviewed the requirements for certification of a partial judgment as final. There, we reiterated our 
holding in Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1984): 
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the action. Second, the 
judgment appealed from must have been entered on an order that would have been appealable but 
for the fact that other claims or parties remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion, 
must make a determination that "there is no just reason for delay" of the appeal. 
In the case before us, the trial court appears to have confused "claim" and "issue." Certification 
requires different claims, not merely different issues. Here we have one claim-ownership of the 
disputed land-supported by different legal theories. 
The trial court stated that the issue of the validity of the land grant was a core dispositive issue, 
because a decision in Union Pacific's favor would moot the other claims and render further 
proceedings unnecessary. *598 Therefore, there was "no just reason to delay directing entry of final 
judgment." While it may be true that if we were to find that Union Pacific prevails under the grant, 
Weiser's other arguments would be irrelevant, the trial court failed to consider the opposite case.-— 
If Union Pacific were to lose on appeal on the land-grant issue, it could pursue its claim under one of 
the reserved theories of law and/or equity, resulting in a piecemeal appeal. We held in Bennion v. 
Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137, 135 (Utah 1992), that "a claim is not separate if a decision on claims 
remaining below would moot the issues on appeal." Here, a ruling that Union Pacific owns the 
disputed land under, for example, adverse possession would moot the appeal now before us. Thus, to 
hear this case in its present form would be to risk a waste of judicial resources. 
FN1. This is rather surprising, considering that the trial court itself concluded that Union 
Pacific did not prevail. 
Apparently relying on our statement in Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1103 (quoting Indiana Harbor Belt 
R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 860 F_._2d 1441, 1445 (7th Cir.1988)), that the determination of the 
separateness of a claim * 'focuses on the degree of factual overlap between the issue certified for 
appeal and the issues remaining in the district court / " the trial court stated that the judgment was 
appropriate for certification because the underlying action involved "multiple claims for relief which do 
not arise out of the same set of operative facts." I t is true that the facts supporting ownership under 
the land grant and under different theories of law and equity do not overlap. These separate facts, 
however, all relate to the single land ownership claim. In sum, here there are neither multiple parties 
nor multiple claims. Therefore, the partial summary judgment is not certifiable under rule 54(b), and 
we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., STEWART, Associate CJ . , and DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur in Justice 
HOWE's opinion. 
Utah,1997. 
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